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CRIMINALIZING CHINA
MARGARET K. LEWIS ∗
The Department of Justice launched the China Initiative in November
2018 to counter national security threats emanating from the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). By June 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
had approximately two thousand active investigations under the Initiative.
People and entities with connections to the PRC’s governing party-state
structure have engaged in trade secret theft and other crimes under U.S. law.
The Department of Justice is not making up a threat. It is, however, framing
that threat in a problematic way.
This Article argues that using “China” as the glue connecting cases
prosecuted under the Initiative’s umbrella creates an overinclusive
conception of the threat and attaches a criminal taint to entities that possess
“China-ness,” based on PRC nationality, PRC national origin, Chinese
ethnicity, or other expressions of connections with “China.” The Article
further contends that, when assessed in light of the goals of deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution, it is worrisome that the
prosecution and punishment of people and entities rests in part on a
connection with “China.” A better path is to discard the “China Initiative”
framing, focus on cases’ individual characteristics, and enhance the
Department of Justice’s interactions with nongovernmental experts.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions launched the
China Initiative: “Chinese economic espionage against the United States has
been increasing—and it has been increasing rapidly. Enough is enough.
We’re not going to take it anymore.” 1 In October 2020, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) released an updated information sheet with dozens of examples
of “China-related” cases since April 2018. 2 More cases are in the pipeline. In
June 2020, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), said that there were “more than 2,000 active
investigations that link back to the Chinese government.” 3 This is a marked
increase from Director Wray’s statement in February 2020 that there were
“about a thousand investigations involving China’s attempted theft of U.S.-

1

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSION’S CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download [https://perma.cc/42VBGWXD] [hereinafter CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET].
2
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S CHINA
INITIATIVE AND A COMPILATION OF CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS SINCE 2018 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1223496/download [https://perma.cc/GC8E-DQEX].
3
Ursula Perano, Wray: FBI Has Over 2,000 Investigations that Trace Back to China,
AXIOS (June 24, 2020), https://www.axios.com/fbi-wray-china-counterintelligenceinvestigations-f809b7df-865a-482b-9af4-b1410c0d3b49.html
[https://perma.cc/2TVJAMWN].
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based technology in all fifty-six of our field offices and spanning just about
every industry and sector.” 4
There is overwhelming evidence that persons—both natural and legal—
with connections to the governing party-state structure of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) have engaged in trade secret theft and other crimes
under U.S. law. 5 There is also clear evidence that the PRC government and
intertwined Chinese Communist Party (CCP, and the collective ruling entity
best termed the PRC party-state) are incentivizing and even recruiting people
at home and abroad to acquire intellectual property in contravention of U.S.
laws. 6 The July 2020 closure of the PRC consulate in Houston underscored
intellectual property as a national security concern: the Trump
administration’s stated reason was “to protect American intellectual property
and [Americans’] private information.” 7 In short, the DOJ is not making up

4

Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Opening Remarks at the China
Initiative Conference at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (Feb. 6, 2020)
(transcript available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/fbi-director-christopher-wrays-openingremarks-china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2AA3-E9TY]); see also William Barr,
U.S. Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the China Initiative Conference at CSIS (Feb. 6, 2020)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference
[https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]) (noting in context of China Initiative that “you should expect
more indictments and prosecutions in the future”); The Latest: FBI Chief Wray Says China
Poses a Serious Threat, AP (July 23, 2019, 11:10 am), https://www.usnews.com/news/
politics/articles/2019-07-23/the-latest-fbi-chief-wray-says-china-poses-a-serious-threat
[https://perma.cc/66NK-PTUU] (“Wray told the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday the
FBI has more than 1,000 investigations involving economic espionage and attempted
intellectual property theft. He says nearly all lead back to China.”).
5
See, e.g., WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., U.S.-CHINA TRADE ISSUES,
IF10030 (2019) (“In October 2018, Crowdstrike, a U.S. cybersecurity technology company,
identified China as ‘the most prolific nation-state threat actor during the first half of 2018.’”).
6
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Chinese Hacking Indictments and
the Frail “Norm” Against Commercial Espionage, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hacking-indictments-and-frail-norm-againstcommercial-espionage [https://perma.cc/CSL5-GY8M].
7
Timeline: The Unraveling of U.S. China Relations, NPR (July 22, 2020, 3:58 PM),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/893767828 [https://perma.cc/3NM5-NQ65]; Michael R.
Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Communist China and the Free World’s Future, Speech at the Richard
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (July 23, 2020) (transcript available at
https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [https://perma.cc/8JTYXY73]) (announcing PRC consulate closing “because it was a hub of spying and intellectual
property theft.”). But see Mark Cohen, The IP Theft Nexus in the Houston Consulate Closing,
CHINA IPR (July 22, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/07/22/the-ip-theft-nexus-in-thehouston-consulate-closing/ [https://perma.cc/HR6N-SJSV] (questioning whether “an
economic espionage matter were really the motivation for this sudden evacuation of the
consulate and not election-year politics”).
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a threat. 8 However, it is framing that threat in a problematic way. It is
constructing a criminal justice initiative under the umbrella of “China” and
criminalizing that concept in a way that is in tension with foundational
principles of the United States’ criminal justice system.
China is itself of course not a defendant in any cases. 9 Federal
prosecutors—supported by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies 10—
must prove each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt
against the specific person accused of criminal conduct. Because the
Initiative’s framing does not alter that ultimate standard for conviction, some
may argue that the label “China Initiative” is mere branding to heighten
awareness, 11 or that creation of this project is simply a savvy move to obtain
greater financial resources. 12 This Article argues that the use of “China” is
far more meaningful. It permeates into the cases and connects those cases
into a larger whole. Although China is not the subject of criminal conviction
8

See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 154 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/X252DSJK] (“[E]vidence indicates that China continues its policy and practice . . . of using cyber
intrusions to target U.S. firms to access their sensitive commercial information and trade
secrets.”).
9
Cf. Adam Hickey, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the China Initiative
Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., at 51:07 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at
https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference
[https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP])
(“[T]he China Initiative is targeting the behavior of a foreign state. Behavior that writ large
poses a strategic threat to the United States. Individual cases are based on individual behavior.
We begin with what someone does, and from there a criminal investigation starts.”).
10
The FBI “is the principal investigative arm of the [DOJ] and a full member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community.” What is the FBI?, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.
fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/23QL-LSMT] (last visited May 10,
2020). It is not, however, the only investigative arm of the DOJ (e.g., Drug Enforcement
Administration). See Organizational Chart, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart [https://perma.cc/FLB7-HT3C].
11
Cf. Jeffrey Mervis, U.S. Prosecutor Leading China Probe Explains Effort that Led to
Charges Against Harvard Chemist, SCIENCE (Feb. 3, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.science
mag.org/news/2020/02/us-prosecutor-leading-china-probe-explains-effort-led-chargesagainst-harvard-chemist [https://perma.cc/3TUQ-DFLP] (“[Y]ou want a little bit of fear out
there to sensitize people to the magnitude of the problem.”).
12
Cf. CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (quoting Attorney General Sessions as
stating: “This Initiative will identify priority Chinese trade theft cases [and] ensure that we
have enough resources dedicated to them . . . .”); China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against
the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of John C. Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.) (“[T]he former Attorney General announced an initiative
to marshal our resources to better address [China’s economic aggression].”) [hereinafter
Statement of Demers].
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and punishment directly, not only does the Initiative’s framing cause Chinaness to become imprinted as a shared characteristic across cases, but also the
language anthropomorphizes China into a condemned form: “If you are an
American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal
data.” 13
Nor do interspersed assurances that the Initiative is not targeted at
“Chinese” people provide an effective antidote to this framing. 14 The
overarching narrative of a China threat undercuts such assurances. For
instance, FBI Director Wray stated in February 2020:
Confronting this threat effectively does not mean we shouldn’t do business
with the Chinese. It does not mean we shouldn’t host Chinese visitors. It
does not mean we shouldn’t welcome Chinese students or coexist with
China on the world stage. But it does mean that when China violates our
criminal laws and international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much
less enable it. 15

There are times when the shorthand “China” is appropriate, such as
when discussing foreign affairs between the United States and the PRC acting
as sovereign states. For example, the two countries’ governments concluded
a trade agreement titled the “U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement.” 16
Criminal law, in contrast, is based on the premise that guilt is individual, not
by association with an entity—China—that does not exist in a form that the
government can directly prosecute. Yet, the government discusses China as
if it is a perpetrator. John Demers, Assistant Attorney General in the National
Security Division and chair of the China Initiative steering group, said at the
Initiative’s launch that, “[w]ith the Attorney General [Session’s] initiative,
we will confront China’s malign behaviors and encourage them to conduct
themselves as they aspire to be: one of the world’s leading nations.” 17 In
13
Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Hudson Institute’s
Video Event on China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions (July 7, 2020) (transcript
available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government
-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/U34G-EXFF]) (emphasis added).
14
See, e.g., id. (“This is not about the Chinese people, and it’s certainly not about Chinese
Americans.”).
15
Id.
16
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Signing of the U.S.-China Phase One Trade
Agreement (Jan. 15, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-signing-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-agreement-2/
[https://perma.cc/MRH6-732A]).
17
CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (emphasis added). See also Statement of
Demers, supra note 12, at 2 (“China is instead pursuing its goals through malign behaviors
that exploit features of a free-market economy and an open society like ours.”).

150

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

February 2020, Attorney General William Barr noted that the DOJ “launched
its China Initiative to confront China’s maligned behaviors and to protect
U.S. technology.” 18
Although this Article is focused on criminal law, the China Initiative is
not just about criminal law.19 The DOJ has stressed that “[c]riminal charges
are only one of our tools.” 20 For example, the Initiative includes working
with the Department of the Treasury to develop regulations. 21 More
generally, the Trump administration emphasized a “whole of government
effort” to confront the PRC. 22 This Article went to press shortly after the
United States elected Joe Biden, at which point it was unclear what aspects
of the China Initiative—and U.S.–China policy more generally—his
administration would change.
A “whole of government effort” should not lose sight of the distinct
roles of different parts of the government. Policies that might fit more
comfortably within the State Department, National Security Council, or other
segments of the executive branch can raise concerns when transplanted into
the world of individual criminal prosecutions. The China Initiative emanates
from the DOJ, 23 and core to the Initiative’s goals is using criminal law to

18

Barr, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Wray, supra note 4 (“We’ve got a whole host of tools we can use, from
criminal charges and civil injunctions to things like economic sanctions, entity listings, visa
revocations.”).
20
The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government (Nov. 18, 2019) (presentation) (on file with
author).
21
See CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1; see also Alan Rappeport, U.S. Says
China Is No Longer a Currency Manipulator, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/us/politics/treasury-china-currency-manipulatortrade.html [https://perma.cc/8HUY-WXFR] (reporting decision to reverse course on
designating the PRC as a currency manipulator while still pressing forward with regulations
“scrutiniz[ing] foreign investment that were devised with China in mind”).
22
See, e.g., Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Int’l Sec. and
Nonproliferation, Remarks at the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Conference on
Great Power Competition (Sept. 11, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.state.gov/
bureaucracy-and-counterstrategy-meeting-the-china-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/2LN7-LM7
Q]) (statement by Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
that “[w]e are working to break down traditional institutional stovepipes to confront Beijing’s
whole-of-system strategy with a broad and coordinated response of our own.”).
23
CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (“The Attorney General’s Initiative reflects
the Department’s strategic priority of countering Chinese national security threats . . . .”).
19
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combat a “China” threat. 24 It is important to ask how the Initiative reflects
the standard principles of criminal liability and justifications for punishment.
The DOJ has articulated considerations that apply any time a decision
is being made whether to prosecute, including the nature and seriousness of
the offense, the deterrent effect of prosecution, and the person’s culpability
in connection with the offense. 25 This combination of utilitarian (e.g.,
deterrence) and retributive (e.g., blameworthiness) considerations carries
through to the sentencing stage if a prosecution leads to a conviction. Federal
judges are tasked with crafting a sentence that reflects four primary purposes:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 26 Particularly
because the DOJ itself decided to amalgamate dozens (and counting) of
prosecutions as reflecting a common threat, an important question that has
not been asked—or at least not publicly debated—is how the “China
Initiative” framing interacts with these basic principles. This Article posits
that the “China Initiative” construct is problematic when viewed from the
perspective of these criminal law principles that undergird the DOJ’s work,
and the implementation of the Initiative has borne out these concerns.
The DOJ’s Justice Manual sets forth not only principles that should
guide decisions to prosecute but also considerations that are impermissible,
including a person’s ethnicity and national origin. 27 This Article does not
claim that the DOJ is intentionally prosecuting people because of their
ethnicity, national origin, or both. But it does argue that the DOJ’s initiative
against “China,” at a minimum, undermines the spirit of nondiscrimination
that the Justice Manual extols. There are also other concerns about the China
Initiative, such as how it might run afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
of equal protection in the context of people’s ability to enter and remain in
the United States.28 But this Article’s focus is on how the U.S. government
24
See Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining when describing the China
Initiative that “[i]nvestigating and prosecuting economic espionage and other federal crimes
will remain at the heart of our work.”).
25
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/
jm/justice-manual [https://perma.cc/EE9B-6N74].
26
U.S. SENTENCING COMM., FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 4 (2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/primers/federal-sentencing-basics [https://perma.cc/C2PDTTZK] (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
27
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 25, at § 9-27.260 (2018).
28
Cf. Emily Feng, Visas are the Newest Weapon in U.S.-China Rivalry, NPR (Apr. 25,
2019, 5:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/25/716032871/visas-are-the-newest-weaponin-u-s-china-rivalry [https://perma.cc/F74Z-34V5] (highlighting the adoption of more
restrictive U.S. visa policies affecting Chinese citizens). The China Initiative itself has not
included travel bans, though the Trump administration has enacted strict limits in other
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enforces criminal laws. It calls for a country-neutral framing of DOJ
initiatives and, when a case does have a nexus to the PRC, greater precision
in how the DOJ addresses that connection. One of the DOJ’s goals is to
“reinforce the trust that leads to cooperation with law enforcement,” 29 yet the
current framing instead undermines trust.
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical backdrop of ways that
China played into the DOJ’s criminal cases prior to 2018. Part II introduces
the design and implementation of the China Initiative. Part III analyzes how
“China” is portrayed in the China Initiative context and argues that the term
lacks clear boundaries: it conflates ideas of government, party, nationality,
national origin, and ethnicity and melds them into an amorphous threat.
Under the banner of the China Initiative, not only has “China” taken on a
criminal taint, but people—both natural and legal—who are viewed as
possessing some level of China-ness are likewise stigmatized. The United
States’ criminal justice system does not allow guilt by association. 30 But the
China Initiative has created threat by association.
Part IV applies the lens of criminal law theory to the DOJ’s emphasis
on “China” as integral to this group of cases. It takes questions usually
focused on individual defendants (e.g., how might prosecuting this person
deter potential criminal conduct?) and also asks them of the China Initiative
as a whole (e.g., how might the China Initiative deter potential criminal
conduct?). This is an unorthodox mode of critique, but it is a useful exercise
contexts. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Travelers Prohibited
from Entry into the United States, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/from
-other-countries.html [https://perma.cc/MGV7-FTH5] (last visited May 11, 2020) (“CDC is
working with public health partners to implement travel procedures announced in several
Presidential proclamations on novel coronavirus.”); Alex M. Azar, II, Sec’y, Health and
Human Serv., Remarks on Declaration of Public Health Emergency for 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/lead
ership/secretary/speeches/2020-speeches/secretary-azar-delivers-remarks-on-declaration-ofpublic-health-emergency-2019-novel-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/76JG-VGRU])
(“[T]he President has signed a Presidential Proclamation . . . temporarily suspending the entry
into the United States of foreign nationals who pose a risk of transmitting the 2019 novel
coronavirus.”); Ruthann Robson, Constitutionality of President’s “Muslim Ban”: Equal
Protection Issues, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/conlaw/2017/01/constitutionality-of-presidents-muslim-ban-equal-protection-issues.html
[https://perma.cc/2D69-PHXB]; see also Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Visa Restrictions for
Chinese Students Alarm Academia, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-students.html
[https://perma.cc/58BV325R] (discussing June 2018 decision of the Trump administration to require annual visa
renewals as compared with the prior policy of five-year student visas).
29
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8.
30
See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961) (“In our jurisprudence guilt
is personal . . . .”).
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in trying to identify why, and even if, the “China Initiative” is a helpful
construct. Part IV warns that, when assessed in light of the goals of
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution, it is worrisome that
the prosecution and punishment of people and entities rests in part on a
connection with “China.”
A better path is to discard the “China Initiative” framing, focus on cases’
individual characteristics, and enhance the DOJ’s interactions with
nongovernmental experts. This approach does not mean building walls such
that discussions cannot extend across cases. It does mean adopting a countryneutral framing and only connecting cases when there is a compelling reason
to do so, not because they have been categorized as part of a larger China
threat. It also means creating a more robust conversation with academia and
the private sector than the initial outreach that is underway. 31 The U.S.
government can and should do a better job of working with nongovernmental
actors to reconcile two real phenomena: the threat by association attaching to
people who possess China-ness and the threats from the PRC party-state that
go far beyond traditional spying. 32 FBI Director Wray has emphasized that
what “we need to understand about the threat from China is just how diverse
and multilayered it is.” 33 A multilayered threat requires a multilayered
understanding, which in turn would be better achieved by drawing on the
well of deep expertise on the PRC that exists outside of the DOJ.

31
See Erin Nealy Cox, U.S. Att’y for the N. Dist. of Tex., Remarks at the China Initiative
Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., 01:08:08 (Feb. 6, 2020) (video available
at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP])
(“[W]e have been partnering with academic institutions and universities as well as corporate
America . . . .”); Dr. Mary Sue Coleman, President of the Am. Ass’n of Univ., Remarks at the
China Initiative Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., 03:19:15 (Feb. 6, 2020)
(video available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc
/2VTX-K5YP]) (noting appreciation for the working relationship that universities are
developing with the FBI).
32
See Jie Dalei, Amy E. Gadsden, Mary Gallagher, Shen Kui, Margaret Lewis, Neysun
A. Mahboubi, Peidong Sun, Rory Truex & Taisu Zhang, Is There a Future for Values-Based
Engagement With China?, CHINAFILE (July 21, 2020), https://www.chinafile.com/conver
sation/there-future-values-based-engagement-china [https://perma.cc/XK88-J2EQ].
33
Wray, supra note 4; see also Catherine Lutz, FBI Director Christopher Wray Wants to
Talk About More than Russia, ASPEN INSTITUTE (July 20, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.
org/blog-posts/fbi-director-christopher-wray-wants-talk-about-more-than-russia/
[https://perma.cc/GU4X-Q68Y] (“China from a counterintelligence perspective represents the
broadest, most challenging threat we face at this time . . . because with them it’s a whole state
effort.”).
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I. INTERACTIONS BEFORE THE INITIATIVE
Criminal cases that somehow have a connection with the government,
people, or place of the PRC are not new to the DOJ. 34 But, until recently,
these cases were largely treated as targeted areas of cooperation—or
contention—rather than as confrontation with an existential threat. 35 In 2008,
a Nevada federal court convicted four PRC nationals for their participation
in a money laundering conspiracy, visa fraud, and other charges related to a
scheme that allegedly siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from the Bank
of China. 36 That case stood out for the coordination between U.S. and PRC
authorities, with one of the defendants voluntarily returning to the PRC and
agreeing to be deposed via videoconference. 37 The 2001 Mutual Legal
Assistance Agreement 38 between the United States and PRC facilitated this
cooperation. 39 A U.S. prosecutor who worked on the case recalled, “[t]he
history of U.S.-China cooperation is short.” 40 The Bank of China case was a
high-water mark for that cooperation.
Other cases have been more contentious. In 1996, a shipment of heroin
from the PRC, hidden in the cavities of dead goldfish, led to a political row
when a U.S. federal judge enjoined the removal of a witness to the PRC

34

See Loren M. Scolaro, Note, The Past, Present, and Future of United States-China
Mutual Legal Assistance, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1688, 1693 (2019) (“The first joint investigation
and prosecution between the United States and China occurred in the late 1980s and early
1990s . . . .”).
35
Cf. Eric Tucker, US Officials Warn Chinese Espionage an ‘Existential Threat’, AP
(Feb. 6, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-officials-warn-chineseespionage-an-existential-threat-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/T7K8-TTL6] (quoting William
Evanina, then nominee to be director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center,
as stating regarding Chinese economic espionage that “[t]he long-term existential threat to the
security of our nation is real.”).
36
See United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2013).
37
See Margaret K. Lewis, Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition: Human Rights
Implications, 2 CHINA RTS. F. 83, 86–87 (2007).
38
See Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, China-U.S., June 19,
2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,102 (entered into force on Mar. 8, 2001).
39
For discussions of the Bank of China case see, e.g., Scolaro, supra note 34, at 1700–01;
Eleanor Ross, Note, Increasing United States-China Cooperation on Anti-Corruption:
Reforming Mutual Legal Assistance, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 839, 853 (2018); Matthew
Bloom, Note, A Comparative Analysis of the United States’s Response to Extradition Requests
from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201–02 (2008).
40
A Personal History of U.S.-China Law Enforcement Cooperation, COLUM. L. SCH. (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/personal-history-us-china-lawenforcement-cooperation [https://perma.cc/9PBN-WSPV] (quoting Ronald Cheng).
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because of the potential that he would face torture or execution.41 Fastforwarding to 2018, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission found that “China remains the largest source of illicit fentanyl
and fentanyl-like substances in the United States.” 42 In 2017, federal
prosecutors charged two PRC nationals for “conspiracies to distribute large
quantities of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues and other opiate substances in
the United States.” 43 PRC-sourced fentanyl remains a point of tension in the
U.S.–PRC relationship. 44
It is also not new to use criminal laws to combat intellectual property
infringements involving the PRC. A low-tech example of intellectual
property infringement in the early 1990s involved 100,000 pairs of
unauthorized KEDS sneakers that were produced by Stride Rite’s former
licensee in the PRC and then imported into the United States as genuine
KEDS. 45 Similarly, in United States v. DeFreitas, the defendant imported

41

See Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To remedy the due process
violations and to protect Wang from future torture, the court entered a permanent injunction
barring the United States from removing Wang or returning him to China . . . . We affirm.”);
see also William W. Tanner, The Case of Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno: The International
Implications of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155 (1994) (analyzing
the case and its impact on U.S.-PRC relations).
42
SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, FENTANYL FLOWS FROM
CHINA: AN UPDATE SINCE 2017 (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/Fentanyl%20Flows%20from%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4LPF3PJ].
43
Justice Department Announces First Ever Indictments Against Designated Chinese
Manufacturers of Deadly Fentanyl and Other Opiate Substances, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct.
17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-first-ever-indictme
nts-against-designated-chinese-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/4TA6-CRZM]; see also
Three Chinese Nationals Using the Alias “Alex” Indicted in the United States for Conspiring
to Import and Distribute Deadly Opioids U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/three-chinese-nationals-using-alias-alex-indictedunited-states-conspiring-import-and [https://perma.cc/L8NB-WU2Z].
44
See, e.g., DEA Acting Administrator Uttam Dhillon’s Visit to Beijing, U.S. DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2020/01/17/dea-actingadministrator-uttam-dhillons-visit-beijing [https://perma.cc/V3UL-SC7H] (“U.S.-China
counternarcotics cooperation was a common theme throughout all of the bi-lateral
meetings.”); GEORGE SERLETIS, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, DEADLY HIGH-PURITY FENTANYL
FROM CHINA IS ENTERING THE U.S. THROUGH E-COMMERCE CHANNELS (2019),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_george_serletis_fentanyl_f
rom_china_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR3C-PT76] (“The fentanyl epidemic is regarded as a
significant national security threat, and the issue is being raised in U.S.-China trade
negotiations.”).
45
United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 578–80 (1st Cir. 1995).
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from the PRC counterfeit Beanie Babies, 46 then a widely popular toy. 47 As a
slightly higher tech example, in 2005, the PRC imprisoned two U.S. citizens
for selling pirated DVDs in a case that was hailed as “a rare success in joint
efforts by the United States and China to enforce intellectual property
laws.” 48 It is, admittedly, neither new nor surprising to have intellectual
property theft accompany a country’s economic development. 49
Nor is economic espionage new. Congress enacted the Economic
Espionage Act in 1996, 50 though in the first five years there were only eleven
prosecutions using the Act. 51 At the time of the Act’s passage, the United
States was ending a period in which it viewed Japan as its major economic
rival in Asia. 52 The PRC had not joined the World Trade Organization

46
COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 129 (4th ed. 2013) (citing United States v. DeFreitas, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
47
Cf. ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (2005) (retelling how, in 1998, “United States Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky was stopped by the U.S. Customs Service; her bags were found to
contain forty-odd counterfeit ‘Beanie Babies’ (a highly popular stuffed toy at the time) she
had purchased in Beijing.”).
48
2 Americans Sentenced in DVD Piracy in China, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/20/business/media/2-americans-sentenced-in-dvd-piracyin-china.html [https://perma.cc/3MGR-W5VH].
49
See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It Till You Make It: The Good News
About China’s Knockoff Economy, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2013, at 25, 29, available
at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-06-11/fake-it-till-you-make-it (“When
the United States was just beginning its rise to wealth and power, it was every bit as much a
pirate nation as China is today. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United Kingdom
was the primary target of thieving Americans, who focused their economic espionage on the
British textile industry.”); see generally Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s
Contribution to China’s Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 427–
35 (2014) (discussing the role of criminalizing intellectual property theft in economic
development).
50
18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2018).
51
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric:
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 421 (2016).
52
See John Hemmings & James Amedeo, Lessons from the America-Japan Trade War of
the 1980s, NAT’L INTEREST (July 2, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/lessonsamerica-japan-trade-war-1980s-24882 [https://perma.cc/8MSN-TUC2].
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(WTO), 53 and it was not yet an economic powerhouse. 54 But this began to
change rapidly in the aughts. Intellectual property concerns expanded beyond
the then open-air Silk Alley in Beijing to the high-tech world of Silicon
Valley. In 2001, police arrested two people trying to board a flight to the PRC
with trade secrets from several Bay Area companies.55 They later pleaded
guilty to economic espionage. 56
Key to economic espionage is that each time the government prosecutes
under this provision it is deciding that the alleged theft of trade secrets is not
just a civil concern for the company claiming theft. Rather, it is a wrong with
broader societal implications that should be addressed via criminal law.57 A
prosecution for economic espionage is also a statement that the theft rises to
the level of harming national security. In contrast to traditional espionage of
government secrets, 58 economic espionage—sometimes termed industrial
espionage—expands the range of protection to the private sphere. 59
There are critics of casting this wider net of criminal liability, 60
especially as economic espionage created a powerful tool for federal

53
See generally Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 97 (2003) (discussing the PRC’s accession in
2001); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 389 (2007)
(noting that PRC applied to rejoin the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the
predecessor of the WTO) in 1986).
54
See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE:
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q878-TKXZ] (detailing how the
PRC’s emergence “as a major economic power has raised concern among many U.S. policy
makers”).
55
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets
from Silicon Valley Companies to Benefit China (Dec. 14, 2006), https://www.justice.
gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2006/yePlea.htm
[https://perma.cc/R35L6WPA].
56
Id.; COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 209; see also United
States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1119, 1119 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing arrest when boarding
flight to China and charges for stealing trade secrets).
57
See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual
Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469 (2011) (proposing an analytical and
normative framework to understand criminal sanctions for IP theft).
58
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799 (2018).
59
See, e.g., NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
IN CYBERSPACE 2 (2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724economic-espionage-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QCL-437L] (“Economic or Industrial
Espionage means (a) stealing a trade secret . . . .”).
60
See Nicola Searle, The Criminalization of the Theft of Trade Secrets: An Analysis of the
Economic Espionage Act, 2 IP THEORY 33, 41–42 (2012) (discussing debate on merits of
criminalizing trade secret theft).

158

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

prosecutors. 61 The DOJ’s addition of a National Security Division in 2006
enhanced the infrastructure for prosecuting economic espionage. 62 Within
the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, the Economic Espionage Unit serves
as a “specialized unit focused solely on prosecuting cases under the
Economic Espionage Act.” 63
A conviction for economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 1831 requires
prosecutors to prove that there is a nexus to a foreign government:
[T]he second mens rea requirement is that the defendant intended or knew that the
offense would “benefit” a “foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent.” . . . A “foreign instrumentality” is “any agency, bureau, ministry, component,
institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or business organization, corporation,
firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded,
managed, or dominated by a foreign government. 64

A DOJ handbook on prosecuting intellectual property crimes explains
that, “if th[e] ‘the entity’ is not a government entity per se, . . . there must be
‘evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated intelligence
activity’ with the entity.” 65
During the Obama administration, intellectual property theft and
espionage with a connection to the PRC shifted from isolated cases toward a
broader program. The FBI expanded its efforts to inform the public of these
concerns. The 2015 threat awareness film titled “The Company Man:
Protecting America’s Secrets” depicted an American recruited by PRC
nationals to engage in industrial espionage. 66 Similarly, the 2010 arrest of a
61
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42681, STEALING TRADE SECRETS AND
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT 1 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM4H-EF9N] (explaining
possible imprisonment of fifteen years along with potential fines of millions of dollars).
62
About the Division, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.: NAT’L SEC. DIV. (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/nsd/about-division [https://perma.cc/5FFL-BSEB] (The Division
serves a coordinating and unifying function and is tasked with “protect[ing] the United States
from threats to our national security by pursuing justice through the law.”).
63
Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s
Threats?, Before the S. Subcomm. On Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Randall C. Coleman, Ass’t Dir., Counterintelligence
Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combatingeconomic-espionage-and-trade-secret-theft [https://perma.cc/KS3E-YNU3].
64
COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 182; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1839(2) (2018) (defining a “foreign agent” as “any officer, employee, proxy, servant,
delegate, or representative of a foreign government”).
65
COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 182–83 (citing 142 CONG.
REC. 27,116 (1996)).
66
The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jul.
23, 2015) https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-the-company-man-protecting-america
s-secrets/view [https://perma.cc/5PS2-ZTH2].
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U.S. citizen for making false statements about his relationship with PRC
intelligence officers—a relationship that began when he was an
undergraduate studying in Shanghai—was the basis for another FBI film,
“Game of Pawns: The Glenn Duffie Shriver Story.” 67 The FBI explained that
the film “educates viewers about the foreign intelligence threat Americans
face abroad.” 68 The FBI coupled this overt public messaging with quiet,
targeted communications: a 2015 letter from the FBI’s Houston field office
requesting assistance in a “national security investigation” preceded MD
Anderson Cancer Center’s July 2018 announcement ousting three scientists
with ties to the PRC. 69
Economic espionage took center stage in 2014 when the DOJ
announced the indictment of five officers of the PRC People’s Liberation
Army for cyber intrusions and economic espionage against U.S.
companies. 70 This case broke as Xi Jinping 71 was settling into his role as the
top leader. The U.S. government still sought—albeit with waning
confidence—to work with the PRC on protecting intellectual property. In
2015, the U.S.-China Cyber Agreement included a provision on refraining
from “knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.” 72
67

Game of Pawns, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 14 2014)
https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-game-of-pawns/view [https://perma.cc/6BD69VEF].
68
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHINA: THE RISK TO ACADEMIA 8 (2019),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/HNW9-U79M].
69
Todd Ackerman, MD Anderson Ousts 3 Scientists Over Concerns About Chinese
Conflicts of Interest, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/MD-Anderson-fires-3-scientists-overconcerns-13780570.php [https://perma.cc/Q983-MLGD].
70
Indictment, United States v. Dong, No. 14-188 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3VT7-53KW]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers
for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial
Advantage (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-militaryhackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/Y7MS-9U3L].
71
The common convention is to put family names first in Chinese. This Article places
Chinese family names first unless the order is reversed in a direct quote or if indicated to be
the preference of the person named.
72
JOHN W. ROLLINS, SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, DIANNE E. RENNACK & CATHERINE A.
THEOHARY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., UNITED STATES-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT, IN10376 (2015).
For earlier efforts at cooperation during the Obama Administration, see, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S.
Att’y Gen., Address at the International Intellectual Property Summit (Oct. 18, 2010), 18,
2010) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ericholder-speaks-international-intellectual-property-summit [https://perma.cc/V2LD-L2A2]) (“I
will travel to Beijing, where I look forward to meeting with my counterparts and other officials
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In 2016, in a nod to concerns about how criminal law was being used to
enforce intellectual property rights, the fact sheet from the 27th U.S.-China
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) included that “[t]he
United States and China confirm that trade secret investigations are
conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.” 73
In 2015, the National Security Division released its “Strategic Plan for
Countering the Economic Espionage Threat.” 74 The DOJ framed this plan in
a country-neutral manner: “To respond effectively to economic espionage,
[the] DOJ must support a whole-of-government approach, just as it does with
other national security threats.” 75 However, the plan did highlight a case
connected to the PRC party-state. 76 The Strategic Plan also announced the
intention to “heighten awareness of the economic espionage threat and
deliver coordinated training,” including to U.S. companies, labs, and
universities. 77 Until 2018, the DOJ had not organized these activities into a
clear, cohesive strategy aimed at countering what it labeled a “China” threat.
The PRC party-state’s announcement in 2015 of a “Made in China
2025” plan in part precipitated heightened scrutiny. 78 The plan targeted ten
strategic industries for development. 79 Although innovation is generally
to discuss how we can build on our nations’ bilateral enforcement efforts through the
Intellectual Property Working Group of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group for Law
Enforcement Cooperation.”).
73
U.S. Fact Sheet for the 27th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Nov. 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2016/november/us-fact-sheet-27th-us-china-joint
[https://perma.cc/6MEW-P9NQ]; see also PRC Ministry of Commerce, Di 27 jie zhong mei
shangmao lian weihui lianhe chengguo qingdan (Jan. 6, 2017), http://mds.mofcom.gov.cn
/article/ghlt/201701/20170102497565.shtml [https://perma.cc/BK9S-8J7H] (Chinese version:
“Zhong mei shuangfang queren, dui shangye mimi anjian de diaocha hui yi jinshen xiaoxin de
fangshi jinxing”).
74
See Richard S. Scott & Alan Z. Rozenshtein, DOJ’s Strategic Plan for Countering the
Economic Espionage Threat, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 23 (2016).
75
Id. at 23; see also H.R. Res. 643, 113th Cong. (2014) (“Calling for further defense
against the People’s Republic of China’s state-sponsored cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets,
including by the People’s Liberation Army.”).
76
Scott & Rozenshtein, supra note 74, at 24 (citing United States v. Liew, 2014 WL
2586329 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2014)).
77
Id. at 25.
78
Scott Kennedy, Made in
China 2025, CSIS (June 1, 2015),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 [https://perma.cc/Q2X9-AWWH].
79
See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT ON
LOCAL PROTECTIONS 10 (2017), https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025global-ambitions-built-local-protections-0 [https://perma.cc/NB8Z-SD3W] (listing strategic
industries for development, such as next generation information technology and new energy
vehicles).
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expected and even encouraged as a country’s economy develops, Assistant
Attorney General John Demers warned Congress in 2018 that “China has
committed to pursuing an ‘innovation-driven’ development strategy and
prioritizing breakthroughs in higher-end innovation. But that is only part of
the story: ‘Made in China 2025’ is as much a roadmap to theft as it is
guidance to innovate.” 80 This warning recalled a 2013 book titled Chinese
Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization. 81
The authors describe “an elaborate, comprehensive system for spotting
foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable, and
converting them into weapons and competitive goods.” 82 When President
Trump took office, these developments during the Obama administration
were coalescing into a more assertive and vocal response to a China threat.
II. THE CHINA INITIATIVE
On November 1, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced the commitment of significant resources to counter the “grave
threat to our national security,” 83 under the title of the “China Initiative.” This
Part describes the design of the China Initiative (Part II.A) and provides an
overview of how the DOJ has implemented it (Part II.B).
A. DESIGN

The China Initiative was launched at a time of growing tensions in many
facets of the U.S.–PRC relationship. The PRC’s island building in the South
China Sea created a brash challenge to the United States’ interests in freedom
of navigation. 84 General Secretary Xi’s growing repression at home and
80

Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 2.
Arturo G. Munoz, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military
Modernization, STUD. IN INTEL., Dec. 2015, at 33 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-4/chinese-industrialespionage-technology.html [https://perma.cc/M6DY-WWZR].
82
Id. at 33; see also James Mulvenon, Beyond Espionage: IP Theft, Talent Programs, and
Cyber Conflict with China, HARV. FAIRBANK CTR. FOR CHINESE STUD. (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/events/critical-issues-confronting-china-series-10/
[https://perma.cc/NE5H-G6QV] (discussing recent trends and noting forthcoming publication
of follow-on book to Chinese Industrial Espionage).
83
Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Announcing New Initiative to Combat Chinese
Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa
/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-combat-chinese-economicespionage [https://perma.cc/EYJ3-UCWN]).
84
See Gregory Poling, The Legal Challenge of China’s Island Building, ASIA MAR.
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Feb. 18, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/the-legal-challenge-ofchinas-island-building/ [https://perma.cc/Q27K-LXKD] (analyzing “the military potential of
China’s unprecedented island building work . . .”).
81
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exertion of influence abroad exacerbated worries about the PRC’s human
rights record and how rights-depriving practices could extend beyond the
PRC’s borders. 85 Trade tensions were also on the rise. Part of the backdrop
to the China Initiative was a March 2018 report by the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative 86 and repeated messaging that “President Trump has
made it clear we must insist on fair and reciprocal trade with China and
strictly enforce our laws against unfair trade. This requires taking effective
action to confront China over its state-led efforts to force, strong-arm, and
even steal U.S. technology and intellectual property.” 87 These comments
made in the context of trade relations on a state-to-state basis were soon
echoed by the DOJ in the criminal context.
In his remarks on November 1, 2018, Attorney General Sessions
explained that “[t]he Initiative was launched against the background of
previous findings by the Administration concerning China’s practices.” 88 He
announced that the Criminal Division and National Security Division would
play key roles. 89 Five U.S. Attorneys were also announced as part of the
Working Group: U.S. Attorneys from the District of Massachusetts, Northern
District of Alabama, Northern District of California, Eastern District of New
York, and Northern District of Texas. 90
Included in the China Initiative’s launch was an announcement of
economic espionage charges against a “PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan
Company, and Three Individuals” for the alleged theft of trade secrets from
Micron, an Idaho-based semiconductor company. 91 These charges were
paradigmatic of the stated purpose of the Initiative:

85

See, e.g., HOOVER INST., CHINA’S INFLUENCE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS: PROMOTING
CONSTRUCTIVE VIGILANCE, (Larry Diamond & Orville Schell eds., 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promotingconstructive-vigilance [https://perma.cc/B58Q-M9YL] (explaining that General Secretary Xi
“has significantly expanded the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu
Jintao”).
86
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 8.
87
U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address
China’s Unfair Trade (Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong [https://perma.cc/4VRSST5A].
88
CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan Company, and
Three Individuals Charged with Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.go
v/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-company-taiwan-company-and-three-individuals-chargedeconomic-espionage [https://perma.cc/P49X-2NUC].
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[The China Initiative] reflects the strategic priority of countering Chinese national
security threats and reinforces the President’s overall national security strategy. In
addition to identifying and prosecuting those engaged in trade secret theft, hacking and
economic espionage, the initiative will increase efforts to protect our critical
infrastructure against external threats including foreign direct investment, supply chain
threats and the foreign agents seeking to influence the American public and
policymakers without proper registration. 92

Economic espionage cases predate the China Initiative: “Chinese
national security threats” 93 were not new. But the DOJ was now pursuing
alleged criminal activity as a unified effort. The DOJ had previously created
initiatives that targeted criminal activities in certain locations. 94 To imprint
this effort with the name of a country, however, was unusual and, perhaps,
unprecedented. 95
B. IMPLEMENTATION

Attorney General Sessions initiated the China Initiative, 96 but he soon
departed. 97 At William Barr’s confirmation hearing in January 2019, he
identified the PRC as the United States’ “paramount economic and military
rival in the world,” and added, “I really thought that Attorney General
Sessions was right on target in setting up his China initiative in the [DOJ] to
start going after the pirating of American technology and other kinds of

92
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese
Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationalscharged-three-separate-china-related [https://perma.cc/FYN3-DDUP].
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Efforts
to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheetdepartment-justice-efforts-combat-mexican-drug-cartels [https://perma.cc/3WAF-TQM5];
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight
Against Mexican Drug Cartels (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjustice-announces-resources-fight-against-mexican-drug-cartels
[https://perma.cc/3LJ8GWSX].
95
The author has found no unified listing of all previous Department of Justice initiatives,
nor any other example of an “Initiative” named for a country.
96
See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 9, at 50:00 (describing Sessions’s announcement as
“sending a signal that cases related to threats from China are a priority, they’re worth spending
your nights and weekends on, because the stakes of those cases are very high. And the
prosecutors in the [DOJ] did not disappoint.”).
97
Peter Baker, Katie Benner, & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney
General as Trumps Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/8YL5-XFL5].
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illegal activities that Chinese nationals are involved in here in the United
States, and even abroad.” 98
The Initiative gained momentum under Attorney General Barr.
Economic espionage was the marquee crime but far from the only one that
was charged. Other charges include theft of trade secrets, wire fraud, making
false statements to a government agency, obstruction of justice, violations of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), computer hacking, international
money laundering, acting as an agent of the PRC without notification to the
U.S. government, and various conspiracy charges. 99 The spectrum of concern
ranges from classic spying 100 to failing to disclose ties to PRC universities
while receiving federal grant funds. 101
Public statements by DOJ officials portend further expansion of the
Initiative. Director Wray stated in a June 2020 interview that the FBI had
more than 2,000 active investigations that link back to the PRC
government. 102 Andrew Lelling, U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, explained in February 2020, “[m]y prediction is that these
cases will spike at some point and then begin to trail off hopefully as industry
and academia become more sensitized to the problem. I can tell you that for
the coming year in Boston what I anticipate frankly is prosecuting more

98

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. William Pelham Barr to be Attorney
General of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 65 (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116shrg36846/CHRG-116shrg36846.htm
[https://perma.cc/WL3A-2X9K]. [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing].
99
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 2.
100
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Singaporean National Pleads Guilty to
Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of Chinese Intelligence (July 24, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/singaporean-national-pleads-guilty-acting-united-statesillegal-agent-chinese-intelligence [https://perma.cc/7TL8-393T].
101
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher at University Arrested for Wire
Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making
-false-statements-about-affiliation [https://perma.cc/HYY3-Q6UQ]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 666
(theft of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds).
102
Perano, supra note 3; see also Wray, supra note 4; Barr, supra note 4 (noting in context
of China Initiative that “you should expect more indictments and prosecutions in the future”);
see also FBI has 1,000 investigations into Chinese intellectual property theft, director
Christopher Wray says, calling China the most severe counter-intelligence threat to US, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (July 24, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3019829/fb
i-has-1000-probes-chinese-intellectual-property-theft-director
[https://perma.cc/3SM8-B
9ZB].
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people.” 103 In an April 2020 article, Assistant Attorney General Demers was
quoted as expressing a desire that all ninety-four U.S. Attorney’s Offices
bring cases under the China Initiative, adding, “[y]ou’re not going to do 125
cases in a year as a U.S. attorney’s office. You’re going to do maybe one,
which would be great. If you do two, that’s very impressive. If you do none,
that’s understandable and you’ll get there next year.” 104
A notable aspect of the China Initiative is that the defendants are a broad
range of people beyond traditional state-directed spies. The DOJ has stressed
the role of “nontraditional collectors” such as researchers at universities and
for-profit laboratories. 105 In July 2018, FBI Director Wray stated, “I think
China, from a counterintelligence perspective, in many ways represents the
broadest, most challenging, most significant threat we face as a country. And
I say that because for them, it is a whole of state effort. It is economic
espionage as well as traditional espionage; it is nontraditional collectors as
well as traditional intelligence operatives; it’s human sources as well as cyber
means.” 106 This concern is seen in the DOJ’s emphasis on the “Thousand
Talents Plan,” a program sponsored by the PRC party-state to recruit people
“with full professorships or the equivalent in prestigious foreign universities
and R&D institutes” to work in the PRC. 107 A November 2019 report by the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that “[t]he FBI’s
103

Andrew Lelling, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Mass., Remarks at the CSIS China Initiative
Conference, at 01:00:43 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at https://www.csis.org/events/chinainitiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]).
104
Betsy Woodruff Swan, Inside DOJ’s nationwide effort to take on China, POLITICO
(Apr. 7, 2020, 9:37 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/07/justice-departmentchina-espionage-169653 [https://perma.cc/T72W-W6GV].
105
See, e.g., Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Christopher Wray, Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of
Investigation) (“I think in this setting I would just say that the use of nontraditional collectors,
especially in the academic setting, whether it’s professors, scientists, students, we see in
almost every—in almost every field office that the FBI has around the country . . . .”); see also
WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF TRADE AND MFG. POL’Y, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION
THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD, 31 n.113 (June 18, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/
06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XFM-QZ97]
(noting that the term “‘non-traditional collector’ is commonly used in the Intelligence
Community . . . .”).
106
Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Aspen Security
Forum (July 18, 2018), (transcript available at https://www.aspeninstitute.org/podcasts/fbidirector-christopher-wray-on-russian-meddling-2/ [https://perma.cc/8KBD-HWP5].
107
Recruitment Program of Global Experts, The Recruitment Program for Innovative
Talents (Long Term), www.1000plan.org.cn/en/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (for people who
sign contracts “for at least 3 consecutive years and with at least 2 months each year working
in China”) [https://perma.cc/8UXH-V6A8].

166

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

slow response to Chinese recruitment operations through the [Thousand
Talents Plan] and other talent recruitment plans provided the Chinese
government the opportunity to recruit U.S.-based researchers and
scientists.” 108
The Thousand Talents Plan was a central feature of the January 2020
charges against Harvard professor Charles Lieber for “making materially
false, fictitious and fraudulent statements.” 109 An indictment was issued in
June 2020. 110 A nanoscience specialist, Dr. Lieber had received U.S.
government grant funding that required disclosure of significant foreign
financial conflicts of interest. 111 He allegedly failed to disclose his
relationship with Wuhan University of Technology and his participation in
the Thousand Talents Plan, through which he received $50,000 per month in
addition to living and lab expenses. 112 The DOJ indicated that additional
arrests in academia would be forthcoming, 113 with “academic espionage”
increasingly entering the lexicon as part of the China threat.114 On February
27, 2020, the DOJ announced the arrest of a University of Tennessee
professor on charges of fraud and false statements connected to his alleged

108

STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., THREATS TO
U.S. RESEARCH ENTERPRISE: CHINA’S TALENT RECRUITMENT PLANS 94 (2019),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5DR-WFZW]. For
an analysis of the Thousand Talents Plan and similar programs, see David Zweig & Siqin
Kang, America Challenges China’s National Talent Programs, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND
INT’L STUD. (May 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-challenges-chinas-nationaltalent-programs [https://perma.cc/SX75-P3F5].
109
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 92 (other cases announced at the same time involved
Ye Yanqing (a lieutenant in the PRC military who allegedly lied on her visa form and
continued to work for the PRC military while in the United States) and Zheng Zaosong (who
allegedly stole biological research from a Boston hospital that was later discovered inside a
sock by airport security)).
110
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Harvard University Professor Indicted on False
Statement Charges (June 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-universityprofessor-indicted-false-statement-charges [https://perma.cc/E7MB-WJWD].
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Michele McPhee, The China Spy Scandal That Entangled Harvard Could Hit Yale and
MIT Next, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 29, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/china-spyscandal-that-entangled-harvard-could-hit-yale-mit-next-1489806?amp=1
[https://perma.cc/WP8R-BV49] (“Federal law enforcement sources tell Newsweek that last
month’s arrest of Charles Lieber . . . is just ‘the first domino to fall.’”).
114
See, e.g., House Defense Bill Includes Provisions on Academic Espionage, For-Profit
Oversight, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 15, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/newsroom/Pages/House-Defense-Bill-Includes-Provisions-on-Academic-Espionage-For-ProfitOversight.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CA7-L4GH].
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affiliation with the Beijing University of Technology. 115 On March 10, 2020,
the DOJ announced that a former West Virginia University professor pleaded
guilty to fraud charges connected to his involvement in the Thousand Talents
Plan. 116
Also of growing interest are PRC-connected actors who are allegedly
influencing the “American public and policymakers without proper
registration.” 117 In May 2019, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force added
a unit aimed at countering China’s political influence in the United States. 118
This unit strengthened the FBI’s investigatory pipeline that can lay the
foundation for later prosecutions. The U.S. government’s announcement in
February 2020 that representatives of five prominent PRC news agencies
would be treated as foreign government functionaries further heightened
attention on efforts by the PRC party-state to influence opinion in the United
States. 119
The DOJ has underscored the long-term nature of the China Initiative.
John Demers said in February 2020, “our work is far from done. We must
settle in for the long haul against the government that proposes a very
different set of social, political, and economic values from those of us in the
west.” 120 John Brown, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence
Division, similarly warned, “[d]oes the world go through Communist China
115
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud
and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-falsestatements-about-affiliation [https://perma.cc/QTS2-7L5R].
116
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former West Virginia University Professor Pleads
Guilty to Fraud That Enabled Him to Participate in the [PRC]’s “Thousand Talents Plan”
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-west-virginia-university-professorpleads-guilty-fraud-enabled-him-participate-people [https://perma.cc/2PZX-NUEC].
117
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 92.
118
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Exclusive: How the FBI Combats China’s Political
Meddling, AXIOS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.axios.com/fbi-china-us-political-influence0e70d07c-2d60-47cd-a5c3-6c72b2064941.html [https://perma.cc/8NP7-ZE68].
119
Lara Jakes & Steven Lee Meyers, U.S. Designates China’s Official Media as
Operatives of the Communist State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2QFS-RVCJ] (naming
Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio, China Daily and The People’s Daily). At the time of writing,
both the United States and the PRC governments were escalating restrictions on
media/journalist presences in each other’s countries. See Vivian Wang & Edward Wong, U.S.
Hits Back at China With New Visa Restrictions on Journalists, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/us/politics/china-journalists-us-visa-crackdown.html
[https://perma.cc/65QT-M2BZ].
120
John Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Nat’l Security, Remarks at the CSIS China
Initiative Conference at 00:03 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at https://www.csis.org/events
/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]).
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or the United States in the next 30 years. We have been deceived too
long . . . . I think we have woken up . . . . Now is a time for action. That action
is together.” 121 Beyond the DOJ, in July 2020, Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo likewise accentuated a protracted conflict ahead: “We must admit a
hard truth that should guide us in the years and decades to come, that if we
want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi
Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply
won’t get it done.” 122
To date, the DOJ’s role in this new paradigm has largely focused on
investigating and prosecuting cases, but these activities have proceeded
alongside a public outreach component. As explained in Part IV.E, this
outreach has yet to mature into a sustained two-way conversation but rather
has principally served as an opportunity for the government to explain its
view of the threat. The Office of Private Sector engages with academic
associations, private companies, and other nongovernmental entities. 123
Created in 2017, the Office grew out of a need to have “an organized,
coordinated, and horizontal approach” to interacting with the private sector
in today’s complex threat environment. 124 An October 2019 summit
addressed “how the academic community can continue to work with the FBI
and other federal agencies to tackle national security threats on our
campuses.” 125 These efforts are laudable and should be expanded. 126
Nonetheless, even more robust interaction between the DOJ and
nongovernment sectors is insufficient to fully ameliorate concerns. The
“China” framing is fundamentally flawed. The DOJ should begin by
rethinking, and reworking, the China Initiative.
121
John Brown, Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence
Division, Remarks at the CSIS China Initiative Conference at 01:00:01 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video
available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTXK5YP]).
122
Pompeo, supra note 7.
123
Office of Private Sector, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about/
partnerships/office-of-private-sector [https://perma.cc/H2RZ-P349] (last visited Jan. 3. 2021).
124
Id.; see also This Week Strengthening Partnerships With American’s Business
Community, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/audiorepository/ftw-podcast-office-of-private-sector-113017.mp3/view [https://perma.cc/Q3U5PHZC].
125
Wray, supra note 4; see also Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigations Off. of
Priv. Sector Summarizing 2019 FBI Academia Summit (Oct. 10, 2019) (available at
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/2019-FBIOPS-Academic-Summit-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS4E-TS2L]).
126
Wray, supra note 4 (“Through our Office of Private Sector, the FBI has stepped up our
national outreach to spread awareness of this threat . . . . Our Office of Private Sector also
engages with a variety of academic associations on the China threat . . . .”).
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III. CRIMINALIZING CHINA
The Obama administration’s export control reform initiative’s goal was
“to build high walls around a smaller yard” by focusing on protecting “crown
jewels.” 127 As the Trump administration’s concerns about PRC-linked
national security threats increased, analysts outside the government revived
this “small yard, high fence” approach as a prudent way of being “selective
in choosing technologies that need protecting, but be[ing] aggressive in
safeguarding them.” 128 The China Initiative’s focus is not only what is
protected within the fence but also who is of particular concern when they
are within the fence. It is not just a matter of being physically within the
United States’ borders, though that is the most conspicuous manner of
stealing intellectual property located therein. The concern is also people
reaching into the fenced area through cyber-intrusions that do not require
physical presence. 129
The U.S. government’s attention is increasingly on intrusions by entities
that are connected to “China.” Assistant Attorney General Demers testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2018, “From 2011 [to]
2018, more than 90 percent of the Department’s cases alleging economic
espionage by or to benefit a state involve China, and more than two-thirds of
the Department’s theft of trade secrets cases have had a nexus to China.” 130
In his remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on
February 6, 2020, FBI Director Wray explained as follows: “The first thing
I think we need to understand about the threat from China is just how diverse
and multilayered it is. And I say that in terms of its techniques, its actors, and
in its targets.” 131
127
Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet on the President’s Export Control Reform
Initiative
(Apr.
20,
2010),
https://fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/wh-export.html
[https://perma.cc/Q38Q-8A8K]; see also Steven Aftergood, Export Control Policy as a Guide
to Secrecy Reform, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Apr. 26, 2010), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy
/2010/04/export_control/ [https://perma.cc/W6UT-MW6H] (discussing the reform initiative).
128
Lorand Laskai & Samm Sacks, The Right Way to Protect America’s Innovation
Advantage, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-1023/right-way-protect-americas-innovation-advantage [https://perma.cc/62HZ-J27G].
129
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Intelligence Officers and Their Recruited
Hackers and Insiders Conspired to Steal Sensitive Commercial Aviation and Technological
Data for Years (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officersand-their-recruited-hackers-and-insiders-conspired-steal [https://perma.cc/FA7L-6H8W]
(“The threat posed by Chinese government-sponsored hacking activity is real and
relentless . . . .”).
130
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5.
131
Wray, supra note 4; see also Lutz, supra note 33 (“China from a counterintelligence
perspective represents the broadest, most challenging threat we face at this time . . . because
with them it’s a whole state effort.”).
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What is this “it” of a “China” threat? Later in those same remarks,
Director Wray added, “[t]o be clear, this is not about the Chinese people as a
whole, and it sure as heck is not about Chinese Americans as a group. But it
is about the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party.” 132 Yet
such interspersed words of assurance do not erase the China Initiative’s
conflation of the PRC party-state (Part III.A) with PRC nationality and
national origin (Part III.B) as well as Chinese ethnicity (Part III.C) into an
amorphous, and even existential, threat. 133 There are a host of conditions each
of which is alone sufficient to connect a person—natural or legal—to the
“China” in the China Initiative. Some of these conditions are immutable (e.g.,
DNA), but China-ness can also be acquired: 134 one can create connections to
“China” such that a criminal taint attaches (Part III.D). In her book Prisoners
of Politics, Rachel Barkow discusses “lumpy” laws that group crimes of
varying seriousness and blameworthiness. 135 The DOJ’s conception of
“China” similarly lumps together an array of people and entities seen as
sharing ties to a common threat. For instance, the opening sentence of a July
2020 press release announcing fraud and false statements charges describes
“[a] rheumatology professor and researcher with strong ties to China . . . .” 136

132

Wray, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Address at the Nat’l Governors Ass’n
Winter Meeting: U.S. States and the China Competition (Feb. 8, 2020) (transcript available at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-states-and-the-china-competition/
[https://perma.cc/DN7Z-GW
YN]) (“We want talented, young Chinese students to come study in the United States of
America.” . . . . The China competition is happening. It’s happening in your states, and it’s a
competition that goes to the very basic freedoms that every one of us values.”); Eric Tucker,
US Researchers on Front Line of Battle Against Chinese Theft, AP NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/afbf4d7f4aac4745b01852571179ceb3 [https://perma.cc/UUR44HT3] (quoting Nat’l Counterintelligence and Security Ctr. Dir. William Evanina as saying:
“Existentially, we look at China as our greatest threat from an intelligence perspective, and
they succeeded significantly in the last decade from stealing our best and brightest
technology.”).
134
“China-ness” is not a common phrase. In writing this Article, however, the use of
“China-ness” was found in an ethnographic account of “Mainland Chinese undergraduates”
studying in Singapore. Peidong Yang, A Phenomenology of being “Very China”: An
Ethnographic Report on the Self-Formation Experiences of Mainland Chines Undergraduate
“Foreign Talents” in Singapore, 42 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 233, 245 (2014) (“Indeed, anything
ranging from ‘bad’ sartorial sense to clumsy Chinese-accented English to the lack of polish in
social manners could be reflected upon by the Chinese scholars in retrospect as ‘very China’ness.”).
135
RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 22 (2019).
136
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher Charged with Illegally Using U.S. Grant
Funds to Develop Scientific Expertise for China (July 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/researcher-charged-illegally-using-us-grant-funds-develop-scientific-expertise-china
[https://perma.cc/P8T8-KLN6] (emphasis added).
133
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This Part breaks down various ties to a broad conception of “China” that
are interwoven into the China Initiative. This Article contends that using
“China” as the glue connecting cases under the Initiative’s umbrella creates
an overinclusive conception of the threat and attaches a criminal taint to
entities that possess “China-ness.” To be clear, prosecutors are not relieved
of the burden of proving all elements of charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. 137 This is not blunt guilt by association. It is threat by
association.
Not only does China-ness become imprinted as a shared negative
characteristic across cases, but the language used in the Initiative
anthropomorphizes China into a form that is ascribed condemnation.
Attorney General Barr warned, “Chinese theft by hacking has been
prominent . . . . Those actions by China are continuing, and you should
expect more indictments and prosecutions in the future . . . . China
complements its plainly illicit activities with facially legal but predatory
behavior.” 138 A DOJ presentation on the China Initiative includes a slide
titled, “What Has China Stolen?” 139 When announcing indictments under the
China Initiative in January 2020, an FBI Boston Division Special Agent
remarked, “China’s goal, simply put, is to replace the United States as the
world’s leading superpower, and they’re breaking the law to get there.” 140
Secretary of State Pompeo amplified these sentiments in his July 2020 speech
by stating, “China ripped off our prized intellectual property and trade
secrets . . . .” 141
Because China is not an actor that can be convicted and punished,
people cannot have traditional accomplice liability flowing from China’s

137

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
138
Barr, supra note 4, at 4–5.
139
“The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20.
140
Joseph R. Bonavolonta, Fed. Bureau of Investigation Bos. Div. Special Agent in
Charge, Remarks Announcing Charges Against Harvard University Professor and Two
Chinese Nationals, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov
/contact-us/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/remarks-delivered-by-fbi-bostonspecial-agent-in-charge-joseph-r-bonavolonta-announcing-charges-against-harvarduniversity-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals [https://perma.cc/B5PK-RUNR].
141
Pompeo, supra note 7.
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actions. 142 China itself cannot steal a robot arm 143 or a corn seed. 144
Nonetheless, the China Initiative spreads a blanket of criminal suspicion over
persons associated with China. For example, in the case of Robert Mo, who
pled guilty to the theft of corn seeds that were the intellectual property of
DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto, 145 “[t]he atmosphere surrounding economic
espionage investigations became so explosive that the federal judge in Mo’s
case barred unnecessary mention of his ethnicity.” 146 The judge recognized
that his China-ness created an impediment to a fair trial.
To be sure, just as China is not a monolith, neither is the DOJ. From this
author’s experience, individuals in the U.S. government working on the
China Initiative vary with respect to how they conceive of the threat, how
they describe the threat, and how sensitive they are to the ways that external
audiences perceive the government’s language and actions. The point here is
not to malign the motives of hardworking investigators and prosecutors, 147
but rather it is to articulate concerns regarding the framework within which
they are working. An initiative can be both well intentioned and
fundamentally flawed.
A country-based framing is a particularly awkward fit for the DOJ,
which is not a part of the U.S. government with deep, country-specific
expertise. The DOJ has an Office of International Affairs that coordinates
interactions with foreign governments, an FBI presence in the Beijing
embassy, and a history of stationing Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Beijing on a

142
Cf. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 161 (2d ed. 2020) (“An accomplice is one who
knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unites with another to commit a crime, or in
some way advocates or encourages commission of the crime.”).
143
Laurel Wamsley, A Robot Named ‘Tappy’: Huawei Conspired to Steal T-Mobile’s
Trade Secrets, Says DOJ, NPR (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01
/29/689663720/a-robot-named-tappy-huawei-conspired-to-steal-t-mobile-s-trade-secretssays-doj [https://perma.cc/2AX7-7HBG].
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Protecting Vital Assets: Pilfering of Corn Seeds Illustrates Intellectual Property Theft,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/senten
cing-in-corn-seed-intellectual-property-theft-case [https://perma.cc/K8XF-S6B8].
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Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese National Sentenced to Prison for
Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinesenational-sentenced-prison-conspiracy-steal-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/PJA8-BUBP].
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Mara Hvistendahl, Surveillance Planes, Car Chases, and a FISA Warrant: How a
Chinese Immigrant Became a Pawn in America’s Technological Cold War with Beijing,
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/01/how-chineseimmigrant-became-pawn-in-us-technological-cold-war-with-beijing
[https://perma.cc/7BRY-D64M].
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See Wray, supra note 13 (“Our folks at the FBI are working their tails off every day to
protect our nation’s companies, our universities, our computer networks, and our ideas and
innovation.”).
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rotating basis to act in a liaison function. 148 However, the Office of
International Affairs does not have any visible role in the China Initiative’s
leadership or working group. Nor has DOJ developed a cadre of investigators
and prosecutors who have substantial linguistic, cultural, and political
expertise relevant to the PRC as one would find in the State Department. FBI
Director Wray recognized the importance of language skills in an April 2019
interview, 149 but it is unclear to what extent DOJ is making progress in
building linguistic capacity let alone broader expertise on the PRC.
This is also not to say that the DOJ stands alone in presenting a
problematic framing of a China threat. Similar trends are seen in other aspects
of U.S. policy toward the PRC. 150 Strongly worded warnings are also found
on both sides of the political aisle: then-presidential candidate Joe Biden, for
example, was criticized for exacerbating xenophobic trends when a campaign
ad claimed that “Trump rolled over for the Chinese.” 151 A comprehensive
accounting of how the U.S. government views the PRC party-state and

148
See Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-oia
[https://perma.cc/6QMX-ATGX] (last visited Nov. 19. 2020); Contact Us: Beijing, China,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legal-attache-offices/asia
/beijing-china [https://perma.cc/TN4G-F4BG] (last visited Nov. 19. 2020); Attorney Advisor
(International)/Resident Legal Advisor, China, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: CAREERS,
https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/attorney-advisor-international-resident-legaladvisor-china [https://perma.cc/X57J-Y6FA] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020); see also DEA Opens
Shop in China to Help Fight Synthetic Drug Trade, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/dea-opens-shop-china-help-fight-synthetic-drug-trade
[https://perma.cc/MVC5-LJ2H] (announcing the Drug Enforcement Administration’s planned
opening of an office in Guangzhou).
149
See A Conversation with Christopher Wray, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr.
26, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-christopher-wray-0 [https://perma.cc/RP
83-K9VB] (“[W]e are trying very hard to recruit people with language skills. Every time I go
to a graduation—an agent or analyst graduation—I’m looking at language skills that are
reflected in the class. So people who speak Mandarin, for example, are certainly attractive to
us. But, again, that’s where partnership with others helps us bridge that gap. So we’re not the
only agency working on this problem, so therefore we’re not solely dependent on our own
linguists. We work so much more closely now with our intelligence community partners, so
we can share and collaborate with each other. And if we work more and more closely with the
private sector, there are ways for us to leverage their expertise.”).
150
See, e.g., Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy toward China at 40 Years:
Hearing before the H. Foreign Affairs Comm., 116th Cong. 3 (2019) (statement of Samm
Sacks, Cybersecurity Policy and China Digital Economy Fellow, New America) (“Overreach
in the form of blanket bans, unwinding global supply chains, and discrimination against
Chinese individuals based on national origin is not the answer.”).
151
Palmer Haasch, Joe Biden’s Latest Ad Said Trump ‘Rolled Over For the Chinese’ on
Coronavirus, and People are Calling It Racist and Xenophobic, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 20, 2020,
5:19 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/joe-biden-ad-china-trump-coronavirus-racistxenophobic-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/26LV-RPKD].
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entities affiliated therewith is beyond the scope of this article. 152 While
highlighting how hawkish rhetoric permeated the Trump administration, 153
the focus here is to demonstrate how—at least with respect to the parts of the
DOJ responsible for criminal prosecutions—the approach should be adjusted
to better fit their particular perch of pursuing individual criminal liability.
Nor does this Article mean to dismiss concerns about the PRC partystate both incentivizing and sometimes explicitly directing actors to engage
in conduct that breaks U.S. laws. 154 More generally, the PRC party-state’s
track record when it comes to respecting human rights and the rule of law is
increasingly worrisome under General Secretary Xi.155 There is, however, a
better path to dealing with real concerns about the PRC party-state than the
U.S. government’s current response. We do not know the extent to which the
ballooning of cases under the China Initiative is due to an uptick in illegal
activities linked to the PRC party-state as compared with the U.S.
government directing investigative resources in a way that is unearthing
long-standing issues. The exact scale and escalation of activities are
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See, e.g., HOOVER INSTITUTION WORKING GROUP ON CHINESE INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES, CHINESE INFLUENCE & AMERICAN INTEREST: PROMOTING
CONSTRUCTIVE VIGILANCE, 193 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/
docs/chineseinfluence_americaninterests_fullreport_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HNA-ZQ
NP] (dissenting opinion of Susan Shirk); see also The New Red Scare on American Campuses,
THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 2020), www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/02/the-new-red-scareon-american-campuses [https://perma.cc/AAU2-LNPT].
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Pompeo, supra note 7.
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See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 9, at 57:00 (noting when discussing slide titled “China
Rewards Theft” that there are incentive systems in place under which “theft is rewarded after
the fact”).
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See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Why China Should Unsign the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 131 (2020) (arguing that,
especially under Xi Jinping, the PRC has failed to meet even the minimal human rights
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unknown, 156 but there is a problem with intellectual-property theft. 157 How
the DOJ is addressing that threat is, however, a problem in itself.
A. THE PRC PARTY-STATE

Economic espionage requires proof that the intellectual-property theft
is linked to a “foreign government.” 158 The power structure in the PRC blends
state and political party in a way that is vastly different from how those terms
are used in the United States. In the United States, candidates generally run
under parties’ banners without holding significant positions within the
parties’ structure (e.g., chairperson of the Democratic National
Committee). 159 Nor do either of the major political parties in the United
States have an organizational structure that is enmeshed in, and actually
supersedes, the government. In the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) is both inexorably intertwined with and superior to the formal
government. 160 “President” Xi Jinping may be the more familiar title to
American audiences, but his real power lies in his position as General
Secretary of the CCP. 161
156
See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE
THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: REASSESSMENTS OF THE CHALLENGE AND
UNITED STATES POLICY 1 (2017), https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/
IP_Commission_Report_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8QB-6WB5] (estimating annual cost
of intellectual property theft—not China specific—to range from $225 billion to $600 billion);
James Andrew Lewis, How Much Have the Chinese Actually Taken?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
AND INT’L STUD. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-much-have-chineseactually-taken [https://perma.cc/HZ93-AFQN] (“Until recently, the United States probably
lost between $20 billion and $30 billion annually from Chinese cyber espionage. This does
not count the losses from traditional espionage (e.g., using agents). The cumulative cost may
reach $600 billion, since this kind of espionage has been going on for more than two
decades.”), Mark Cohen, The 600 Billion Dollar China IP Echo Chamber, CHINA IPR BLOG
(May 12, 2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019), /05/12/the-600-billion-dollar-china-ip-echochamber/ [https://perma.cc/B26H-63K6]. (analyzing the challenges of defining “IP theft” and
calculating losses that can be attributable to China).
157
Cf. Lelling, supra note 103, at 01:09:00 (“[t]here is something of a cultural divide
between academia and law enforcement and so convincing academic institutions that there
really is a problem has sometimes been difficult . . . ”).
158
See supra notes 50–65 and accompanying text.
159
Cf. About the Democratic Party, DEMOCRATS, https://democrats.org/who-weare/leadership-2-2/ [https://perma.cc/2KK7-6GPF] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020) (showing that
the Chair of the Democratic Party is Tom Perez, who is not an elected official).
160
See generally Ling Li, “Rule of Law” in a Party-State: A Conceptual Interpretive
Framework of the Constitutional Reality of China, 2 ASIAN J. L. S. 93 (2015) (identifying and
conceptualizing the structural features of the PRC party-state).
161
Kate O’Keeffe & Katy Stech Ferek, Stop Calling China Xi Jinping ‘President,’ U.S.
Panel Says, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-
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The interconnections between party and state in the PRC are not easily
conveyed in visual depictions, yet they resemble two strands in a double
helix: an entity can exist in the state strand or party strand, but it is never far
removed from a bond that would connect it to the other side. 162 Under
General Secretary Xi, this dynamic of party and state has shifted to an even
more party-centric structure, as if the party is the nucleus of an atom with
lightweight government bodies orbiting it.163
It is this juggernaut of PRC party-state that is the foreign government
for economic espionage purposes. In that respect, the DOJ’s conflation of the
PRC’s formal government and the CCP as an intermeshed structure is an
accurate description of power distribution in the PRC. Where the DOJ’s
description of “China” in the China Initiative takes a fear-provoking turn is
by repeated intimations of a communist threat. William Evanina, Director of
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, stressed in February
2020, “Xi Jinping has one goal: to be the global leader geopolitically,
militarily, and economically. And he and his communist party will stop at
nothing to get there.” 164 John Brown of the FBI likewise emphasized the
increase in intellectual-property theft “for the benefit of communist
China . . . communist China” and set up a stark contrast: “Does the world go
through communist China or the United States in the next 30 years?” 165
Attorney General Barr warned in July 2020 that “[a] world marching to the
beat of Communist China’s drums will not be a hospitable one . . . .” 166 The
Trump administration’s broader accentuation of the “Communist” in CCP
was made all the more clear by titling Secretary of State Pompeo’s major
policy address in July 2020 “Communist China and the Free World’s
Future.” 167

calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000
[https://perma.cc/2NS6GRSX].
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See MARGARET K. LEWIS, Seeking Truthful Names: The External Implications of
China’s Internal Ideology and Organisation, LAW AND THE PARTY IN XI JINPING’S CHINA:
IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATION 155–56 (Rogier Creemers & Susan Trevaskes eds., Cambridge
University Press) (2020) (draft on file with author).
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See id. at 159–60.
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William Evanina, Dir., Nat’l Counterintelligence and Sec. Ctr., Remarks at the Ctr. for
Strategic and Int’l Studies China Initiative Conference, at 9:00 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available
at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]).
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Brown, supra note 121, at 46:45; 01:01:00.
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William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen. Delivers Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Museum (July 16, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.justice.
gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-china-policy-gerald-rford-presidential [https://perma.cc/Z4KQ-LVZT]).
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In name, the CCP is a communist party. In reality, the CCP bears little
resemblance to textbook communism. 168 It is better understood as the
backbone of a deeply repressive, authoritarian state that has allowed limited
economic reforms with “signs point[ing] toward further entrenchment of
statism.” 169 Rhetoric that presents the challenge as a clash with communism
is misplaced. 170 A more accurate path would be for the DOJ to adopt
consistent phrasing of a “PRC party-state.” The U.S. government can be
extremely disciplined with fraught language, as demonstrated by the delicate
terminology used in the context of “Taiwan” and the United States’ “One
China Policy.” 171 In the context of national security concerns linked to the
PRC, the DOJ can and should be more precise in describing the node of the
threat. One indication that this might be starting to occur is the titling of FBI
Director Wray’s February speech as “Confronting the China Threat” 172 but
his July speech as “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the
Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the
United States.” 173 It is unclear, however, the extent to which this shift reflects
a deeper grappling with the complex nature of the PRC party-state and how
best to express this in the U.S. government’s language.
The DOJ’s expansive description of the challenge that the PRC partystate poses is also accurate insofar as the CCP’s influence reaches beyond the
approximately 90 million CCP members. 174 Nonetheless, phrasing such as
“[t]he CCP has launched an orchestrated campaign, across all of its many
tentacles in Chinese government and society, to exploit the openness of our
168
See China Opinion, Chinese Communism is a Magic Mirror, MEDIUM.COM (July 23,
2020), https://medium.com/@anotherchinaopinion/chinese-communism-is-a-magic-mirror52fec4a71bd6 [https://perma.cc/AZZ2-AKHE] (“‘We are the Communist Party of China, and
we will define what Communism is.’ That’s what Chen Yuan, the deputy governor of China’s
central bank, told political scientist Tom Robinson at a dinner party in the mid-1980s.”).
169
Scott Kennedy, China Won’t Be Scared into Choosing Marketization, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-wont-bescared-choosing-marketization [https://perma.cc/JBG5-MUUF]; see also Jessica Chen Weiss,
A World Safe for Autocracy?: China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics, FOREIGN AFF.
July/Aug. 2019, at 92.
170
See, e.g., Pompeo, supra note 7.
171
See RICHARD C. BUSH, BROOKINGS INST., A ONE-CHINA POLICY PRIMER (2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/
[https://perma.cc/NKU4NLXJ].
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Confronting the China Threat, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/wray-addresses-china-threat-at-doj-conference-020620
[https://perma.cc/2YHM-N4BY].
173
See Wray, supra note 13.
174
See CPC Members Exceed 90 Million, CHINA DAILY (June 30, 2019, 11:00 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/30/WS5d1825c6a3103dbf1432b08f.html
[https://perma.cc/ZK88-9KE7].
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institutions in order to destroy them[,]” as used by Attorney General Barr,
expresses these interconnections in a sinister manner. 175 The reality of what
Party membership means—let alone tangential ties by virtue of being a PRC
citizen living in the PRC today—is complex. 176 This texture is lost in the
blunt Communist-threat rhetoric that dominated during the Trump
administration.
The DOJ’s description of “China” in the China Initiative also lacks a
recognition of the space, albeit constrained, for entities within the PRC to
withstand pressure to engage in “coordinated intelligence activity” 177 with
the PRC party-state. Andrew Lelling, U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, asserted, “If you are collaborating with any Chinese entity,
whether it’s a university or a business, you are giving that technology to the
Chinese government.” 178 In contrast, William Zarit, a senior counselor at The
Cohen Group with a long career in the U.S. foreign commercial service,
cautioned, the U.S. government needs to be “balanced in our approach . . . we
have to be very, very clear that we don’t punish the Chinese people in this
whole process, but actually focus on the real culprits.” 179
This demarcation between “Chinese people” and “real culprits” is not
clear cut. If “real culprits” means only the PRC leadership, they too are
people who are Chinese. If “real culprits” is expanded to CCP members
versus “Chinese people,” that takes approximately 90 million people out of
the “Chinese people” and fails to account for the significant variation among
CCP members. The Chinese people and the PRC party-state simply do not
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Their Motivations for Joining, AUSTL. BROADCAST CO. NEWS, (July 24, 2020, 9:43 PM),
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(citing 142 CONG. REC. 27, 116 (1996)).
178
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[https://perma.cc/CE22-T4GZ].
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separate neatly into two entirely discrete categories. 180 Yet the Trump
administration used a binary framing: Secretary of State Pompeo explained
in July 2020 that the United States must “engage and empower the Chinese
people—a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from
the Chinese Communist Party.” 181
Thus, on the one hand, comments like that from U.S. Attorney Lelling
above indicate that contact with “any Chinese entity” is tantamount to
handing information to the Chinese government. On the other hand, Pompeo
separated Party and people into two buckets. Both of these approaches
diminish the space for human agency: individuals making decisions. If an
individual’s actions break the law, then prosecuting that individual might be
warranted. To the extent that individuals are not just breaking the law but
doing so in ways that benefit the PRC party-state, then this triggers national
security concerns. Countering efforts by the PRC leadership to incentivize
and even direct individuals to engage in acts that violate U.S. law is exactly
what U.S. law enforcement should be doing. The question is how this work
is being done. The China Initiative has conflated the central concern on
activities intertwined with the PRC party-state with a broader conception of
China-ness that encompasses PRC nationality and national origin as well as
Chinese ethnicity and other expressions of connections with “China.”
B. PRC NATIONALS AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

The DOJ has stated repeatedly that the China Initiative is not targeted
at PRC nationals or people who have familial ties to the PRC. 182 The FBI’s
publication titled, “China: The Risk to Academia,” explains that the “FBI
recognizes, and values, [the] unique package of benefits these international

180
See Kerry Brown, The Communist Party of China and the Idea of ‘Evil’, OXFORD POL.
REV. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2020/04/24/china-series-1/
[https://perma.cc/5EWE-ADMT] (“The Party deliberately sets out to integrate and reach deep
into society. The most prudent thing one can say about the relationship between the two is that
they are very complex.”).
181
See Pompeo, supra note 7.
182
See, e.g., Securing the U.S. Research Enterprise from China’s Talent Recruitment
Plans: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Homeland Sec. &
Gov’t Affairs Comm., 115th Cong. (2019) (statement of John Brown, Assistant Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation Counterintelligence Div.) [hereinafter Statement of Brown]. Similar
remarks have been echoed by other parts of the U.S. government, see, e.g., Marie Royce,
Assistant Sec’y of State for Educ. and Cultural Affairs, Remarks at the EdUSA Forum (July
30, 2019), https://eca.state.gov/highlight/assistant-secretary-royce-remarks-edusa-forum
[https://perma.cc/J9GZ-39R5] (“We want future students and their families to see the United
States as a welcoming destination to earn their degrees. We value the presence of students
from China on our campuses, in our communities, and in our country.”).
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students and professors provide.” 183 This assurance is undercut by the same
publication’s warning that the United States’ open academic environment
“also puts academia at risk for exploitation by foreign actors who do not
follow our rules or share our values,” and that “the Chinese government uses
some Chinese students—mostly post-graduate students and post-doctorate
researchers studying science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM)—and professors to operate as non-traditional collectors of
intellectual property . . . .” 184
Rhetoric entangling the PRC party-state with people who hold PRC
citizenship, have familial ties to the PRC, or both is rife in the China
Initiative. In January 2019 when announcing charges against
telecommunications company Huawei, Acting Attorney General Matthew
Whitaker stated, “[a]s I told Chinese officials in August, China must hold its
citizens and Chinese companies accountable for complying with the law.” 185
At his confirmation hearing, Attorney General Barr stated his support for the
China Initiative and how it was “going after the pirating of American
technology and other kinds of illegal activities that Chinese nationals are
involved in here in the United States, and even abroad.” 186 In February 2020,
Attorney General Barr again blurred the lines between the party-state and the
broader population by cautioning, “[t]he Chinese have long been a
commercial people. But for China, purely economic success is not an end in
itself.” 187 In July 2020, Secretary of State Pompeo warned of the threat posed
by PRC nationals in the United States, stating “not all Chinese students and
employees are just normal students and workers that are coming here to make
a little bit of money and to garner themselves some knowledge. Too many of
them come here to steal our intellectual property and to take this back to their
country.” 188
Admittedly, the percentage of people illegally engaged in acquiring
intellectual property for the benefit of the PRC party-state who are PRC
nationals is unknown. It is logical that a higher percentage of people engaged
in these illicit activities would be PRC nationals as compared with Canadian,
Cambodian, or Chilean nationals. This Article does not recommend that the
183
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DOJ allocate investigatory resources proportionally across people from all
nations. Nevertheless, there is a difference between prioritizing intellectual
property theft and following evidence of suspicious activity wherever it may
lead (even if to a higher proportion of PRC nationals) and setting forth with
the explicit intention of countering a “China” threat and then having that
framing influence where the inquiry leads. The former starts from a premise
that PRC nationals have space to be distinct from the PRC party-state,
whereas the latter conflates citizenship with the governing power structure.
For instance, a February 10, 2020, DOJ press release announcing an
indictment under the banner of the China Initiative points to an “unacceptable
pattern of state-sponsored computer intrusions and thefts by China and
its citizens.” 189 A February 15, 2019, DOJ announcement of “Chinese
National Sentenced to Prison for Selling Counterfeit Computer Parts” begins,
“[a] Beijing, China man [sic] was sentenced today to 54 months in federal
prison for directing the shipment of counterfeit computer-networking
equipment into the Southern District of Texas.” 190
Concerns about conflation of PRC party-state with PRC nationals—and
people who once held that status even if they later changed their
citizenship—predate the China Initiative.191 Warnings about suspicion at
least in part based on nationality have also reached beyond the PRC context.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Orly Lobel wrote in 2016, “[t]hrough
references to ‘Chinese actors [as] the world’s most active and persistent
perpetrators’ and to ‘the many Russian immigrants with advanced technical
skills who work for leading US companies,’ the argument for greater
protection [of intellectual property] appears to derive at least some of its
power from xenophobia.” 192
Recognition that a response to activities directed by the PRC party-state
would increase suspicion of PRC nationals ramped up with the launch of the
China Initiative. In his December 2018 Senate testimony, John Demers
stressed the need to focus on nontraditional collectors including researchers,
189
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer
Fraud, Economic Espionage and Wire Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency
Equifax, (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-military-personnelcharged-computer-fraud-economic-espionage-and-wire-fraud-hacking
[https://perma.cc/V963-C6WT].
190
Press Release, U.S. Dept’ of Just., Chinese National Sentenced to Prison for Selling
Counterfeit Computer Parts (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-nationalsentenced-prison-selling-counterfeit-computer-parts [https://perma.cc/D3TB-ZH4D].
191
See, e.g., MARA HVISTENDAHL, THE SCIENTIST AND THE SPY: A TRUE STORY OF CHINA,
THE FBI, AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE (2020) (recounting the story of a PRC-born scientist
pursued by the U.S. government for trying to steal trade secrets).
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“some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and
conflicted loyalties.” 193 A 2019 FBI case example of a “Chinese Citizen’s
Theft of Weapons Technology for Chinese Employment Opportunity” refers
to the “Chinese citizen” sixteen times on a single page and lists the following
as the first “Lessons Learned”: “Divided Loyalty to a Country[:] The Chinese
citizen felt the U.S. company’s information would benefit Chinese weapons
and aerospace programs.” 194 Assistant Attorney General Demers further
warned of existent, albeit unverifiable to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, ties between the PRC party-state and a “Chinese company” in one
case and a “Chinese scientist” in another:
And while we could not prove in court that these thefts were directed by the Chinese
government, there is no question that they are in perfect consonance with Chinese
government economic policy. The absence of meaningful protections for intellectual
property in China, the paucity of cooperation with any requests for assistance in
investigating these cases, the plethora of state sponsored enterprises, and the
authoritarian control exercised by the Communist Party amply justify the conclusion
that the Chinese government is ultimately responsible for those thefts, too. 195

The Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the National Security
Division reiterated these cases of a “Chinese company” and “Chinese
scientist” for which, although the DOJ lacked proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, conditions in the PRC “amply justify the conclusion that the Chinese
government is in some sense responsible for those thefts, too.” 196
The DOJ’s depiction of a string-pulling PRC party-state behind the
scenes is reflected in the December 2019 report by the JASON group
(commissioned by the National Science Foundation) on “Fundamental
Research Security.” 197 The Report found regarding the actions of the
193

Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CASE EXAMPLE: NON-TRADITIONAL COLLECTOR
(2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-case-example-weapons-technology-2019.
pdf/view [https://perma.cc/Z448-JFZW].
195
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5; see also Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra
note 68, at 2 (“These Chinese scholars may serve as collectors—wittingly or unwittingly—of
economic, scientific, and technological intelligence from U.S. institutions to ultimately benefit
Chinese academic institutions and businesses.”).
196
Adam S. Hickey, Press Release, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Nat’l Sec. Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Fifth National Conference on CFIUS and Team Telecom
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-adams-hickey-national-security-division-delivers-0 [https://perma.cc/KR8T-EZ5P].
197
JASON, FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH SECURITY, JSR-19-2I, at 2 (Dec. 11, 2019)
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=299700 [https://perma.cc/9CPT-L87F].
JASON is an elite science advisory group that has been providing analysis to the U.S.
government since 1960. See Ann Finkbeiner, Jason—a Secretive Group of Cold War Science
194
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“Chinese government” in the U.S. academic sector that “[t]he scale and scope
of the problem remain poorly defined, and academic leadership, faculty, and
front-line government agencies lack a common understanding of foreign
influence in U.S. fundamental research, the possible risks derived from it,
and the possible detrimental effect of restrictions on it that might be enacted
in response.” A November 2019 Senate report noted that “[u]niversity
officials also described the FBI’s outreach on the threat that China poses as
‘haphazard’ and or a ‘mixed bag.’” 198 These observations were preceded by
a raft of statements by academic institutions expressing concern over how the
DOJ’s focus on PRC nationals was impacting their communities, a sampling
of which follow:
• A February 21, 2019, statement by the Berkeley leadership: “At
a time when national security issues involving foreign countries
make the front pages of our newspapers, it is critical that we not
become any less welcoming to students, staff, faculty, visiting
scholars, and other members of our community who come from
those countries, or for whom those countries are an ancestral
home.” 199
• A May 23, 2019, statement by the President of Yale University:
“In recent weeks, tensions in United States-China relations and
increased scrutiny of academic exchanges have added to a sense
of unease among many international students and scholars here
at Yale and at universities across the country. I write now to
affirm Yale’s steadfast commitment to our international
students and scholars; they are vital to the university
community.” 200
• An August 12, 2019, statement by twenty-two organizations
(e.g., Association of American Colleges and Universities, the
Chinese American Citizens Alliance, and PEN America)
Advisers—is Fighting to Survive in the 21st Century, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCI. (June 27, 2019, 1:30 PM) https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/jason-secretivegroup-cold-war-science-advisers-fighting-survive-21st-century
[https://perma.cc/Z6P7CUKT].
198
STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 108, at 97–98.
199
Carol Christ, Paul Alivisatos, & Randy Katz, Reaffirming our Support for Berkeley’s
International Community, BERKELEY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019) https://news.berkeley.edu
/2019/02/21/reaffirming-our-support-for-berkeleys-international-community/
[https://perma.cc/LN86-V3QS].
200
Paul Salovey, Yale’s Steadfast Commitment to our International Students and Scholars
(May 23, 2019), YALE UNIV. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, https://president.yale.edu/yalessteadfast-commitment-our-international-students-and-scholars
[https://perma.cc/MN2CFR7T].
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raising concerns about the FBI’s outreach on campuses and
cautioning that “calls to monitor individuals solely based on
their country of origin violate norms of due process and should
raise alarms in a democracy.” 201
An August 30, 2019, op-ed by the President of Columbia
University: “The FBI has stepped up its scrutiny of research
practices at college and university campuses . . . .[M]ost
worrisome to me, as someone who has spent five decades
advocating freedom of expression and assembly, is the notion
that university personnel—and perhaps students themselves—
should be asked to monitor the movements of foreign-born
students and colleagues. This is antithetical to who we are.” 202
An October 10, 2019, statement by the University of Michigan
leadership affirming that, despite heightened scrutiny around
potential international conflicts of interest, “not for a moment
are we going to diminish our commitment to being a welcoming
place for students and faculty from all around the world.” 203
A November 7, 2019, statement by UCLA’s Office of the
Chancellor noting concerns about potential theft of intellectual
property but warning that “we must never resort to suspicion
based on a person’s national origin. To do so is nothing short of
discrimination, which is antithetical to our values as an
institution. Racial profiling, in any context, is corrosive to our
community.” 204

201
Statement in Response to Report the FBI is Urging Universities to Monitor Chinese
Students and Scholars, PEN AM. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://pen.org/fbi-universities-monitoringchinese-students/ [https://perma.cc/JEZ9-XVKK].
202
Lee C. Bollinger, “No, I Won’t Start Spying on My Foreign-Born Students,” (opinion)
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-i-wont-startspying-on-my-foreign-born-students/2019/08/29/01c80e84-c9b2-11e9-a1feca46e8d573c0_story.html [https://perma.cc/53YF-A7Y3]; see also Lee C. Bollinger,
Columbia’s Commitment to our Foreign-Born Students and Visiting Scholars, COLUM. UNIV.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT (Sept. 3, 2019), https://president.columbia.edu/news/columbiascommitment-our-foreign-born-students-and-visiting-scholars
[https://perma.cc/48YGTZM4].
203
Mark S. Schlissel, Martin A. Philbert, & Rebecca Cunningham, Supporting Our
Global Research Community, UNIV. OF MICH. OFF. OF THE PROVOST: PROVOST COMMC’N (Oct.
10, 2019), http://www.provost.umich.edu/provost_comm/20191009global.html [https://perm
a.cc/6H22-562L].
204
Gene D. Block, Emily A. Carter, Roger Wakimoto, Michael Meranze, Reaffirming
UCLA’s Commitment to International Collaboration and the International Community,
UCLA OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, (Nov. 7, 2019), https://chancellor.ucla.edu/messages
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Throughout these statements runs the concern for “othering” 205: that
people bearing PRC nationality or of PRC national origin will be branded as
outside and even antagonistic to what is “American.” A concern for othering
of foreigners by law enforcement authorities is not new, 206 but the us–our
versus them–their rhetoric has taken on a sharper tone particularly with
respect to “Chinese” in contrast to “Americans.” After noting that
“international students and professors” contribute to the U.S. academic vigor,
the FBI’s publication titled “China: The Risk to Academia,” adds,
“[h]owever, this open environment also puts academia at risk for exploitation
by foreign actors who do not follow our rules or share our values.” 207 The
publication asserts that the PRC and its academics engage in “endemic
plagiarism”: “Many recent high-profile examples show plagiarism is
commonplace throughout Chinese academic and research institutions.” 208
This is in contrast to the DOJ’s depiction of American values: “Innovation in
aviation has been a hallmark of life and industry in the United States since
the Wright brothers first designed gliders in Dayton more than a century
ago . . . . U.S. aerospace companies invest decades of time and billions of
dollars in research. This is the American way. In contrast, according to the
indictment, a Chinese intelligence officer tried to acquire that same, hardearned innovation through theft.” 209
The contrast of American versus Chinese is further apparent in the U.S.
government’s depiction of Chinese companies. 210 A PowerPoint slide used
/reaffirming-uclas-commitment-international-collaboration-international-community/
[https://perma.cc/9HC4-NJCR].
205
Cf. Erin Kerrison, Wizdom Powell & Abigail Sewell, Object to Subject: Three
Scholars on Race, Othering, and Bearing Witness, OTHERING & BELONGING, Fall 2018, at 16,
17 (quoting Powell as saying “I think to be othered is to be denied the fullness of one’s
humanity. It’s about reminding people . . . that ‘you’re not one of us.’”).
206
See, e.g., Willful Blindness: Consequences of Agency Efforts To Deemphasize Radical
Islam in Combating Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 114th Cong. 1 (2016)
(statement of Michael German, former Special Agent, Fed. Bureau of Investigation.) at 6 (“A
counterterrorism discourse that pits Americans against one another will not improve our
national security.”).
207
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 68, at 1 (emphasis added).
208
Id.
209
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Intelligence Officer Charged with
Economic Espionage Involving Theft of Trade Secrets from Leading U.S. Aviation
Companies (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/chinese-intelligenceofficer-charged-economic-espionage-involving-theft-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/SNX8GCRG] (quoting Benjamin C. Glassman, U.S. Att’y for the S. Dist. of Ohio).
210
See, e.g., SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, HOW CHINESE
COMPANIES FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM THE UNITED STATES (2019),
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by the DOJ in its presentations on the China Initiative includes the
“[n]ationality of the world’s 10 largest companies, according to annual
Forbes Global 2000 list,” using national flags to show shifts from 2004 to
2018. 211 In 2004, the composition was seven U.S. companies, two British
companies, and one Japanese company. 212 In 2019, there were four U.S.
companies, one Dutch company, and four PRC companies. 213 The stark
categories are also reflected in statements. John Demers testified in
December 2018 that, “[i]n all of these cases, China’s strategy is the same:
rob, replicate, and replace. Rob the American company of its intellectual
property, replicate the technology, and replace the American company in the
Chinese market and, one day, the global market.” 214 One of the “goals of the
China Initiative” is to “Identify Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases
involving Chinese companies that compete unfairly against U.S.
businesses.” 215
The “Chinese” versus “American” company binary is explicit in the FBI
publication titled, “China: The Risk to Corporate America,” which includes
advice on “Combating Foreign Adversaries’ Tactics to Target Your
Company”: “To address the potential vulnerability foreigner visits to
company facilities can present, keep visitor groups together . . . .” 216 This
section is written in country-neutral terms, but it is still nested within a
publication explicitly on the “China” threat. This framing not only presents
“Corporate America” as a discrete entity, but also depicts the threat as
specifically emanating from China.
Other times the us-versus-them contrast is expressed in terms of
“western” and “Chinese,” with William Evanina referring to “a Western
civilization company.” 217 At the same February 2020 conference, FBI
Director Wray described how “China has grown its economy rapidly by
combining low-cost Chinese labor with Western capital and technology.” 218
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%20Companies%20Facil
itate%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9D9-D7LV].
211
”The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5.
215
”The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20; see also Statement of Demers,
supra note 12, at 8 (“[W]e will identify the violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by
Chinese companies, to the disadvantage of American firms they compete with.”).
216
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHINA: THE RISK TO CORPORATE AMERICA 8 (2019).
217
Evanina, supra note 164, at 12:00.
218
Wray, supra note 4.
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Although corporations have not become so multinational as to
completely shed associations with any one country, the labeling of
companies as Chinese or Western is an oversimplification. Take Lenovo, for
example: in 2005, the PRC-based company (formerly “Legend”) acquired
IBM’s Personal Computing Division making it the “third-largest personal
computing company in the world.” 219 Today, Lenovo is headquartered in
Hong Kong with operational centers in North Carolina, Beijing, and
Singapore. 220 Or Monsanto, a former American company at the center of a
high-profile economic espionage case involving the PRC, that Bayer, a
company based in Germany, purchased in 2016. 221 Was it still “Western” and
thus of heightened importance to U.S. national security? Robert Mo (Mo
Hailong), a PRC national, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in
2016 after pleading guilty to a conspiracy to steal trade secrets: “Mo Hailong
stole valuable proprietary information in the form of seed corn from DuPont
Pioneer and Monsanto in an effort to transport such trade secrets to
China . . . . The theft of agricultural trade secrets, and other intellectual
property, poses a grave threat to our national economic security.” 222 The shift
of Monsanto’s status from “ours” to “Germany’s” by virtue of corporate
ownership did not change that Monsanto continued to have significant
intellectual property situated in the United States.
The American Chamber of Commerce in China allows resident (i.e.,
“legally registered in the US and China”) and nonresident (i.e., “legally
registered in the US and not in China”) corporate members. 223 And the U.S.China Business Council’s membership criteria provides, “[f]oreign
companies with one or more offices incorporated in the United States may
also be eligible, but are approved for membership on a caseby-case [sic]

219
Company History, LENOVO, https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/lenovo/company-history/
[https://perma.cc/NN6E-K8M2] (last visited March 4, 2020).
220
Locations, LENOVO, https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/lenovo/locations/ [https://perma.
cc/8XQF-Z3BH] (last visited November 19, 2020).
221
See Greg Roumeliotis & Ludwig Burger, Bayer to Buy Monsanto, Creating a Massive
Seeds and Pesticides Company, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.scientific
american.com/section/reuters/bayer-to-buy-monsanto-creating-a-massive-seeds-andpesticides-company/ [https://perma.cc/9ZQB-BFZL]; HVISTENDAHL, supra note 191, at 252
(“‘Monsanto appreciated all of the efforts that were taken by the U.S. Government to protect
intellectual property,’ a spokeswoman for Bayer wrote me after the merger.”)
222
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 145. For a detailed, and gripping, account of this case,
see generally HVISTENDAHL, supra note 191.
223
Large
Corporate
Membership,
AM. CHAMBER OF COM.: CHINA,
https://www.amchamchina.org/membership/1 [https://perma.cc/E8J3-TMRT] (last visited
November 19, 2020).
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basis.” 224 It is too simplistic to express the identity and loyalty of companies
with national flags.
Certainly, some companies are directly under the control of the PRC
party-state, most obviously if they are traditional state-owned enterprises.
Less direct ties can also leave a company vulnerable to party-state influence.
Curtis Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng describe “the dynamics of capture in
the Chinese economy” as follows: “[F]irms of all ownership types face a
choice: Grow and prosper by nestling up to the state and demonstrating the
capacity to deliver on key party-state objectives, or seek autonomy from the
state and risk being marginalized.” 225 The Council on Foreign Relations
explains, “[t]he government has considerable sway over Chinese private
companies through heavy regulation.” 226 But the report adds, “Huawei has
distanced itself from the CCP, repeatedly asserting that its equipment has
never been used, and will never be used, to spy.” 227 Tim Rühlig in his May
2020 paper titled, “Who Controls Huawei?” analyzes Huawei’s complex
governance structure and cautions, “[i]t is likely that the Chinese party-state
controls Huawei to such an extent that it could leverage technological
dependencies to obtain political concessions.” 228 The fine-grained analysis
that Dr. Rühlig goes through to reach this point underscores the complicated
relationships between companies and the PRC party-state. 229

224

USCBC Membership Application, U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, https://www.uschina.
org/about/join/application [https://perma.cc/L35F-ZC6F] (last visited November 19, 2020).
225
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 670 (2015).
226
Lindsay Maizland & Andrew Chatzky, Huawei: China’s Controversial Tech Giant,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/huaweichinas-controversial-tech-giant [https://perma.cc/F668-BAWA]; see also Tim Culpan,
Huawei’s Ties to China’s Military Aren’t the Problem, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/huaweis-ties-to-chinas-military-arent-theproblem/2019/06/27/c48cf4e0-98af-11e9-9a16-dc551ea5a43b_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7D2P-NE5M] (arguing that “[t]he problem is that the Shenzhen-based
company has spent considerable time and energy trying to weaken any perception that it’s tied
to the Chinese government.”).
227
Id.
228
TIM RÜHLIG, WHO CONTROLS HUAWEI? IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 19 (2020),
https://www.ui.se/globalassets/butiken/ui-paper/2020/ui-paper-no.-5-2020.pdf
229
See Dangerous Partners: Big Tech and Beijing: Hearing before Subcomm. on Crime
and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2020) (statement of Samm
Sacks) (“Chinese corporate actors are not synonymous with the Chinese government or [CCP],
and have their own commercial interests to protect.”).
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The U.S. government’s charges against Huawei may well eventually be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 230 But the framing is presented as a
sweeping battle with “China” rather than a targeted prosecution against a
specific company. A week before the February 2020 announcement of a
superseding indictment against Huawei, Attorney General Barr warned,
“[w]ithin the next five years, 5G global territory and application dominance
will be determined. The question is whether . . . the United States and our
allies can mount sufficient competition to Huawei to retain and capture
enough market share to sustain the kind of long-term and robust competitive
position necessary to avoid surrendering dominance to China.” 231 He added,
“[a]s a dictatorship, China can marshal an all-nation approach—the
government, its companies, its academia, acting together as one.” 232
C. CHINESE ETHNICITY

In the 1880s, prosecutors charged Yick Wo, an immigrant from then
Qing-Dynasty China, with violating a San Francisco ordinance when he
continued to operate his laundromat after the city denied his permit. 233 The
Supreme Court concluded that this was a selective prosecution aimed at a
Chinese-owned business. 234 Justice Matthews wrote, “[t]he rights of the
petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not
less, because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.” 235
230
Cf. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate
Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade
Secrets (Feb. 13. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglo
merate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering [https://perma.cc/774M-FJLK] (“The
charges in the superseding indictment are allegations, and the defendants are presumed
innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.”). The
charges against Huawei are further notable for illustrating the potential overlap of criminal
and civil penalties for intellectual-property theft. See Huawei Pleads Not Guilty to
Racketeering in Beefed-Up U.S. Case, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020, 2:07 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-04/huawei-pleads-not-guilty-toracketeering [https://perma.cc/CL2H-QV54] (“Huawei has said the new accusations rest on
‘recycled civil disputes from the last 20 years that have been previously settled, litigated, and
in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.’”).
231
Barr, supra note 4.
232
Id.
233
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886).
234
See id. at 362 (“The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance,
and of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of business all the
numerous small laundries, especially those owned by Chinese . . . .”). The case is still taught
today as an important example of a prosecution being struck down as impermissibly based on
ethnicity/race. See, e.g., MARC L. MILLER, RONALD F. WRIGHT, JENIA I. TURNER & KAY L.
LEVINE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 182 (6th ed. 2019).
235
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
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Over a century later, the DOJ’s conception of a “China” threat
encompasses nationality, as discussed in Part II.B, as well as people who are
ethnically Chinese, whether or not they actually have any ties to the PRC. 236
In “China: The Risk to Academia,” the FBI’s first example of a “technique”
that “foreign adversaries” might use to access information via academics is
“[a]ppeals to ethnicity or nationality (for example, common ethnic heritage
or dual-citizenship).” 237
Simultaneously, the DOJ has reassured that it is not focusing on people
because of their nationality or ethnicity. John Brown, the assistant director
of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division stated in November 2019, “I
cannot overstate that ethnicity plays no role in our investigations. Instead, we
follow facts and evidence wherever they lead.”238 He reiterated in February
2020, “[w]e are not focused on the Chinese people as a whole . . . we’re
focused on those committing crimes and conducting intelligence activities
for communist China.” 239 William Evanina similarly stressed in February
2020, “[w]e hear a lot of pushback in the government about this as a racial
issue. Totally disagree. This is a fact-based issue of the theft of intellectual
property, trade secrets, and ideas by a communist country.” 240
One challenge in untangling when the rhetoric surrounding the China
Initiative refers to nationality as compared with ethnicity is linguistic.
“Chinese” is commonly used when referring both to nationality and ethnicity.
For example, an October 30, 2018, DOJ press release explained how
“Chinese actors” used hacking methods, and then in the next sentence
referred to “two Chinese nationals.” 241 In Mandarin Chinese, by contrast, the
phrasing for Chinese ethnicity (hua ren) and PRC nationality (zhonghua
renmin gongheguo guomin) are distinct. That it requires more disciplined

236
This Article uses “ethnicity” because it is referring to people’s status as having some
historical connection to Chinese ancestry, even if that far predates the PRC. As used by the
U.S. Census Bureau, race is classified into five groups: “White, Black or African American,
Asian, American Indian and Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander.” U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, RACE & ETHNICITY, [https://perma.cc/WH4E-UCHM]. There is debate over
the terms “race” and “ethnicity.” See, e.g., Nancy López, The US Census Bureau Keeps
Confusing Race and Ethnicity, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 28 2018, 6:40 AM),
https://theconversation.com/the-us-census-bureau-keeps-confusing-race-and-ethnicity-89649
[https://perma.cc/Y2UA-F9GB].
237
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 68, at 7.
238
Statement of Brown, supra note 181.
239
Brown, supra note 121, at 48:30.
240
Evanina, supra note 164, at 17:55.
241
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Intelligence Officers and Their Recruited
Hackers and Insiders Conspired to Steal Sensitive Commercial Aviation and Technological
Data for Years, supra note 129.
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phrasing to express these two concepts in English does not relieve the speaker
from taking steps to do so.
The blurring of nationality and ethnicity stretches far before the China
Initiative. Recent requests under the Freedom of Information Act unearthed
that the Hoover-era FBI “singled out Chinese American scientists because of
their ethnicity—and that it did so even after the Senate’s Church Committee,
formed in 1975, exposed some of the most egregious intelligence abuses of
the era . . . .” 242 More recently, Congressman Ted Lieu cautioned in 2015 that
“one of their issues that our federal government has had is inability of our
government to realize the distinction between a foreign national and an
American citizen who happens to be of Asian-American descent.” 243
There are many people who are ethnically Han Chinese but have no ties
to the PRC. 244 Associating “Han Chinese” with a threat emanating from the
PRC party-state is overinclusive. Take for example Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanborn naturalized U.S. citizen, who was charged in 1999 with selling
information about the United States’ nuclear program to the PRC
government. 245 After nearly a year in solitary confinement, a federal judge
accepted his plea on a single count and stated, “Dr. Lee, I tell you with great
242
Mara Hvistendahl, The FBI’s China Obsession, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 2, 2020, 4:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/02/02/fbi-chinese-scientists-surveillance/ [https://perma.
cc/V2VP-E2ED].
243
Discrimination Suspect in Chinese-American Scientists’ Arrests, NPR, (Nov. 7, 2015,
8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/11/07/455120089/discrimination-suspect-in-chineseamerican-scientists-arrests [https://perma.cc/23DW-WYJU]; see also Chris Fuchs, Chinese
National Accused of Economic Espionage Scheduled for Arraignment Thursday, NBC NEWS
(June 16, 2016, 9:48 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/chinese-nationalaccused-economic-espionage-scheduled-arraignment-thursday-n593601
[https://perma.cc/V2ZC-8NSV]. Viewing people who exhibit some type of China-ness with
wariness is not confined to the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Dan Primack, GOP
Congressman Accuses California Pension Official of Working for China, AXIOS (Feb. 26,
2020), https://www.axios.com/jim-banks-calpers-pension-china-5f549756-9c23-4b0e-b70c41fbec1d2a6e.html [https://perma.cc/VHS2-GVQC]; John Gittelsohn, Sridhar Natarajan, &
Jenny Leonard, CalPERS’ Top Money Man is Targeted in Fears of Chinese Espionage, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020, 2:51 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-0225/calpers-ben-meng-targeted-china-fears [https://perma.cc/J56R-YJYW] (quoting Ben
Meng: “I was associated with the [Thousand Talents Plan] through my employment with
SAFE. Any connection to the program ended when I left. I am a proud American citizen.”).
244
See People: Fact Focus, TAIWAN.GOV.TW, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/
content_2.php [https://perma.cc/PZT7-RBYZ] (last visited May 11, 2020) (explaining
“Taiwan may be described as a predominantly Han Chinese society, with more than 95 percent
of the population claiming Han ancestry . . .”); see also Razib Khan, The World’s Largest
Ethnic Group: Han Chinese, from North to South, MEDIUM (Feb. 16, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/KX5P-HYZJ] (“The ethnogenesis of the Han dates to the first millennium
B.C. — as the Zhou dynasty took the helm from the Shang dynasty.”).
245
United States v. Lee, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281–82 (D.N.M. 1999).
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sadness that I feel I was led astray last December by the executive branch of
our government through its Department of Justice . . . .” 246 In 2006, Dr. Lee
obtained a $1.645 million settlement from the U.S. Government for “leaks
disseminated to the press by government officials during the investigation of
security lapses at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1990s . . . .” 247 The
case also prompted self-reflection by the media with the New York Times
largely standing behind its reporting but noting, among other points, “[w]e
never prepared a full-scale profile of Dr. Lee, which might have humanized
him and provided some balance.” 248
The case against Dr. Lee and the surrounding reporting was flawed. Yet
there was truth that he had access to nuclear secrets and that he had contacts
with foreign visitors, including from the PRC. 249 This combination was
reason to have him, and all other people in comparable positions, subject to
tight protocols. What is interesting about Dr. Lee’s case is how ethnicity
played a central role. He is ethnically Han Chinese but was born in Taiwan
under Japanese rule. 250 His ethnicity only connects him to the PRC by virtue
of historical ties that far predate the PRC’s founding. Likewise, today the
vast majority of Taiwan’s population is ethnically Han Chinese, 251 but their
identity is distinct—and increasingly so—from that of people in the PRC. 252
246

WEN HO LEE & HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME 2 (2001).
Dr. Wen Ho Lee Obtains Landmark Settlement in Legal Battle with U.S. Government
Arising from Press Leaks During Los Alamos Investigation, Jones Day (June 2006),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/practices/experience/2009/08/dr-wen-ho-lee-obtainslandmark-settlement-in-legal-battle-with-us-government-arising-from-press-leaks-duringlos-alamos-investigation
[https://perma.cc/LDN7-UNDD].
248
From the Editors: The Times and Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/26/us/from-the-editors-the-times-and-wen-ho-lee.html
[https://perma.cc/78KT-F2M8].
249
See, e.g., Matthew Purdy, The Making of a Suspect: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/04/us/the-making-of-a-suspect-thecase-of-wen-ho-lee.html [https://perma.cc/55RT-JRKE] (“In 1994, Dr. Lee surprised
laboratory officials when he appeared uninvited at a Los Alamos briefing for visiting Chinese
scientists and warmly greeted China’s leading bomb designer.”).
250
Report on the Government’s Handling of the Investigation and Prosecution of Dr. Wen
Ho Lee, Report of the S. Judiciary Comm., Dep’t of Just. Oversight Subcomm. 107th Cong.
(2001).
251
People: Fact Focus, supra note 244 (explaining “Taiwan may be described as a
predominantly Han Chinese society, with more than 95 percent of the population claiming
Han ancestry”).
252
Cf. Nathan Batto, Recent Changes in National Identity, FROZEN GARLIC (June 20,
2020), https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2020/06/20/recent-changes-in-national-identity/
[https://perma.cc/U7MW-BEYU] (describing long-term trend toward increased self247
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Beyond Taiwan, there is an expansive ethnically-Han diaspora that reaches
around the world and is, to varying degrees, distinct from—and sometimes
even antagonistic to—the PRC. 253
Nevertheless, the DOJ’s rhetoric conflates ethnicity with the “China” of
the “China Initiative.” In a February 2020 interview, Andrew Lelling, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, explained, “[t]he bottom line is
that this is an effort by a rival nation state to steal U.S. technology . . . And
that rival nation is made up almost exclusively of Han Chinese. And so,
unfortunately, a lot of our targets are going to be Han Chinese. If it were the
French government targeting U.S. technology, we’d be looking for
Frenchmen.” 254 There is truth that the overwhelming majority of PRC
citizens are Han Chinese. And U.S. Attorney Lelling’s argument fits our
current era of risk assessment tools in so far as that a person who is a
“Frenchman” by virtue of nationality or ethnicity is statistically less likely to
have ties to the PRC party-state than a person who is ethnically Han Chinese.
This risk-assessment mode was explicit in remarks by the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the National Security Division regarding the China
Initiative and foreign investment in the United States: “While there is a
presumption of innocence in the criminal context, we are here today as risk
managers, not criminal lawyers.” 255 U.S. Attorney Lelling’s remarks
highlight the blurring of these “risk manager” and “criminal lawyer” roles.
As risk assessment tools have been embraced in areas of criminal justice
outside of the China Initiative, they have also fallen under increasing scrutiny
for being “ineffective, inaccurate and perpetuat[ing] the well-documented
bias in the criminal justice system against low-income people and people of
color.” 256 The unearthing of a 2017 FBI memo on the rise of a “black identity
extremist” movement generated criticism that the FBI was “reverting to the
surveillance and sabotage of black activists that had defined its activities in
the civil rights era.” 257 Equating ethnicity with an enhanced risk of criminal
conduct linked to the PRC party-state risks repeating these mistakes.
identification as exclusively Taiwanese and March 2020 survey result of 70.3% as
“completely unprecedented”).
253
See Khan, supra note 244.
254
Mervis, supra note 11.
255
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 196.
256
The Good, Bad and Ugly of New Risk-Assessment Tech in Criminal Justice, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
2020/02/the-good--bad-and-ugly-of-new-risk-assessment-tech-in-criminal-j/
[https://perma.cc/PZ7Q-KR9Y].
257
Alice Speri, Fear of a Black Homeland, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 7:31 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/black-identity-extremist-fbi-domestic-terrorism/
[https://perma.cc/GW7U-6R8F].

194

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

A study of economic espionage cases from 1997 to 2015 that coded for
people of Chinese descent in part based on last names of defendants 258 found
that, “[f]rom 1997 to 2009, 17% of defendants charged under the [Economic
Espionage Act] were of Chinese descent while an additional 9% were Other
Asians. After 2009, however, the percentage of Chinese espionage
defendants tripled to 52% while the rate for Other Asians remained at 9%.” 259
However, “this Study cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese-Americans
are simply committing three times as much espionage today as they did prior
to 2009.” 260 Further challenging an empirical analysis is prosecutorial
discretion with respect to charging decisions and resolution via guilty pleas:
few cases go to trial and, for those defendants who plead guilty, it is
sometimes to lesser charges. 261 Moreover, that an investigation does not
result in charges—or that charges are dropped before trial—is not standing
alone evidence of discrimination. There are a myriad of reasons why a
prosecutor might decide not to pursue a case. What is difficult to glean from
the outside are the motivations behind decisions related to investigating and
prosecuting cases. 262 In sum, the study is worrisome but inconclusive.
Similarly, information released by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in
June 2020 showed that the PRC was the source of undisclosed support “[f]or
93% of the 189 scientists whom NIH has investigated,” and 82% of those
people investigated were Asian. 263 Whether these numbers are proportionate
to the actual number of scientists who have undisclosed financial support
from the PRC party-state is, however, unknown.
Accordingly, this Article is not making an empirical claim that the DOJ
is actually investigating or prosecuting people of PRC nationality, Chinese
ethnicity, or both at a higher rate than people of other nationalities or
ethnicities who are equivalently situated (e.g., researchers with similar access
258
Andrew Chongseh Kim, Prosecuting Chinese “Spies”: An Empirical Analysis of the
Economic Espionage Act, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 781–84 (2018).
259
Id. at 753.
260
Id. at 754.
261
Cf. id. at 787–91(coding “defendants as ‘possibly innocent’ of being spies when they
were charged under the [Economic Espionage Act] but pleaded guilty only to false statements”
and noting high percentage of cases resolved via guilty pleas).
262
Cf. BARKOW, supra note 135, at 135 (“Although it is theoretically possible to bring a
claim for vindictive or selective prosecution on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification,’ the hurdles for doing so are so high that almost no
one prevails in even getting discovery, much less succeeding on the underlying claim.”) (citing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)).
263
Jeffrey Mervis, Fifty-Four Scientists Have Lost Their Jobs as a Result of NIH Probe
into Foreign Ties, SCIENCE (June 12, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2020/06/fifty-four-scientists-have-lost-their-jobs-result-nih-probe-foreign-ties [https://perma.
cc/2JK5-2TWQ].
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to intellectual property and similar indicators of potential legal violations).
We simply do not have the data to prove or disprove such a claim.
What this Article is arguing is that the DOJ has framed the China
Initiative in a manner that expresses the U.S. government’s conclusion that
people exhibiting China-ness are an enhanced threat and that message is
being reiterated by officials charged with leading the Initiative. If you go
looking for people who are ethnically Chinese and have committed crimes,
you will in all likelihood find some. But that does not clarify the prevalence
of people who are ethnically Chinese among the population committing those
crimes. You also risk increasing the chances that people who have not
committed crimes, but who are ethnically Chinese, will be subject to
heightened scrutiny.
In a February 2020 letter to the FBI, members of the House of
Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Reform wrote “to request
information about counterintelligence efforts of the [FBI] that reportedly
target ethnically Chinese scientists. There are certainly authentic and
legitimate cases of espionage that should be investigated. However,
according to news reports, the FBI has arrested and charged many ChineseAmerican scientists who have turned out to be innocent.” 264 In March 2020,
Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the ACLU “filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request for all records from six federal agencies
pertaining to the government’s efforts to scrutinize, investigate, and
prosecute U.S.-based scientists and researchers perceived to have
connections to China.” 265 And organizations such as the Society of Chinese
Bioscientists in America are conducting seminars with titles like, “What to
Do When Your University, FBI, or DOJ Knocks on Your Door: Responding

264

Letter from Jamie Raskin, Chairman, Subcomm. on C.R. & C.L., & Judy Chu, Chair,
Cong. Asian Pac. Am. Caucus, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb.
20, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-0220.JR%20Chu%20to%20Wray-FBI%20%20re%20Ethnic%20Targeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUP9-NQ86] (footnote omitted); see also Letter from Jamie Raskin,
Chairman, Subcomm. on C.R. & C.L., & Judy Chu, Chair, Cong. Asian Pac. Am. Caucus, to
Francis Collins, Dir., Nat’l Inst. Health (Feb. 20, 2020), (https://oversight.house.gov
/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-02-20.JR%20Chu%20to%20CollinsNIH%20re%20Ethnic%20Targeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5SZ-8HMX] (footnote omitted).
265
Press Release, Asian Am. Advancing Just., Advancing Justice: AAJC and ACLU
Seeks Records on Federal Investigations, Prosecutions, and Agency Action Against Scientists
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/press-release/advancing-justice-aajcand-aclu-seeks-records-federal-investigations-prosecutions-and
[https://perma.cc/9RUFY2Y9].
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to University, Criminal, and Civil, and Investigations,” to address concerns
of PRC-nationals and Chinese-American scientists. 266
Just because some of the people prosecuted under the China Initiative
are Caucasian, U.S. citizens does not cleanse the Initiative of these concerns.
As explained by L. Rafael Reif, President of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, “faculty members, post-docs, research staff and students tell me
that, in their dealings with government agencies, they now feel unfairly
scrutinized, stigmatized and on edge—because of their Chinese ethnicity
alone. Nothing could be further from—or more corrosive to—our
community’s collaborative strength and open-hearted ideals.” 267 Pointing to
prosecutions of people who do not present as ethnically Chinese is an
insufficient response to this stigma.
Concerns about an overinclusive framing of a threat also expand beyond
the government and bleed into the general public. In her dissenting opinion
to a 2018 report on PRC party-state influence in the United States, Susan
Shirk cautioned that “overstating the threat of subversion from China risks
causing overreactions reminiscent of the Cold War with the Soviet Union,
including an anti-Chinese version of the Red Scare that would put all ethnic
Chinese under a cloud of suspicion.” 268 That the novel coronavirus COVID19 originated in the PRC has further heightened concerns about the
stigmatization of people who display some form of China-ness: “On college
campuses, at a music conservatory, in Chinese restaurants, among the ranks
of a famous dance troupe and on streets every day, Asians have reported a
rise in aggression, micro and macro.” 269 Former presidential candidate
266
Soc’y of Chinese Bioscientists in Am., What to Do When Your University, FBI, or
DOJ Knocks on Your Door: Responding to University, Criminal, and Civil, Investigations,
GOTOWEBINAR https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/7110915936603617548 [https://pe
rma.cc/39ER-Y9GK] (last visited Nov. 19, 2020); see also Elizabeth Redden, Letter: ‘Racial
Profiling Harms Science’, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 22, 2019) https://www.insidehighered
.com/quicktakes/2019/03/22/letter-racial-profiling-harms-science [https://perma.cc/AP4R-K
MXS].
267
L. Rafael Reif, Letter to the MIT Community: Immigration is a Kind of Oxygen, MIT
NEWS (June 25, 2019), http://news.mit.edu/2019/letter-community-immigration-is-oxygen0625 [https://perma.cc/25ZJ-NDMY]. Such stigmatization and scrutiny can feed stereotypes
of people of Chinese ethnicity and, in turn, generate stereotype threat. Cf. Russell A. McClain,
Bottled at the Source: Recapturing the Essence of Academic Support as a Primary Tool of
Education Equity for Minority Law Students, 18 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS
139, 162 (2018) (“[S]tereotype threat refers to the effect that negative group stereotypes can
have on the performance of members of those groups.” (footnote omitted)).
268
Shirk, supra note 152, at 193.
269
Reis Thebault, Alex Horton & Lateshia Beachum, How to Prepare for Coronavirus in
the U.S., WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2020, 5:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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Andrew Yang wrote in April 2020 regarding increasing anti-Asian American
sentiments, “[w]e Asian Americans need to embrace and show our
American-ness in ways we never have before.” 270 While his prescription
prompted vigorous debate, 271 what is clear is that sensitivity as to how the
China Initiative equates ethnicity with enhanced threat is needed now more
than ever. 272 Eric Dreiband, the former Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, was spot on when he wrote in April 2020, that “the coronavirus
originated in China, and some people have targeted Asian Americans and
Asians simply because of their ethnicity. This conduct has no place in
America.” 273
D. ACQUIRED CHINA-NESS

The “China” in the China Initiative has spilled over beyond meaning the
PRC party-state to encompass nationality, national origin, and ethnicity.
China-ness can further attach to people whose passports and DNA have no
connection to the PRC. China-ness can be acquired.
health/2020/02/26/how-to-prepare-for-coronavirus//?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/YF4AMDBD]; see also Mara Hvistendahl, As Trump and Biden Trade Anti-China Ads, Hate Crimes
Against Asian Americans Spike, THE INTERCEPT (May 11, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/05/11/china-trump-biden-asian-american-hate-crimes/
[https://perma.cc/P6N5-V2ZT]; Reports of Anti-Asian Assaults, Harassment and Hate Crimes
Rise as Coronavirus Spreads, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Jun. 17, 2020),
https://www.adl.org/blog/reports-of-anti-asian-assaults-harassment-and-hate-crimes-rise-ascoronavirus-spreads [https://perma.cc/9A47-BAZS].
270
Andrew Yang, Opinion, We Asian Americans Are Not the Virus, But We Can Be Part
of the Cure, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2020, 3:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/04/01/andrew-yang-coronavirus-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/ZW5C-M4
BP].
271
Compare Canwen Xu, Opinion, Andrew Yang Was Wrong. Showing Our
‘Americanness’ is Not How Asian-Americans Stop Racism, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020, 4:35
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/03/andrew-yang-was-wrong-show
ing-our-american-ness-is-not-how-asian-americans-stop-racism/ [https://perma.cc/XKC7-LR
UZ] with Melissa Chen, In Defense of Andrew Yang, SPECTATOR USA (Apr. 4, 2020, 4:40
PM), https://spectator.us/andrew-yang-right-america-asians-racism-coronavirus/ [https://per
ma.cc/8LSQ-6XWG].
272
Concerns prompted introduction of congressional resolutions “urg[ing] public officials
to denounce . . . ’anti-Asian sentiment, racism, discrimination and religious intolerance
related to COVID-19.’” Anne Q. Hoy, Science Societies Endorse Congressional Resolutions
Denouncing Anti-Asian Racism, AM. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT SCI. (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.aaas.org/news/science-societies-endorse-congressional-resolutions-denouncinganti-asian-racism [https://perma.cc/N3SS-EF97].
273
Eric Dreiband, Opinion, How the Justice Department is Standing Up For Civil Rights
Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. EXAM’R (Apr. 9, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/how-the-justice-department-is-standing-up-for-civilrights-amid-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/HM87-64YJ].
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In August 2019, reports surfaced of the FBI questioning several
American graduates of Yenching Academy in Beijing. 274 Though this
questioning might have been for well-grounded reasons, Rebecca Arcesati
pointed out that the limited information about the FBI’s contacts with
American students “may discourage young talents from participating in these
academic exchanges, and even jeopardize people’s careers.”275 Especially for
students considering a career requiring security clearances, contacts that are
necessary to understand the PRC can also run the risk of creating an
impression of being too close to “China.” That the DOJ press releases for the
espionage convictions of Kevin Patrick Mallory and Ron Rockwell Hansen
included that they “speak[] fluent Mandarin Chinese” 276 prompts the
question why their linguistic abilities were noteworthy enough for the press
releases.
Dragon-slayer and panda-hugger have long been tropes for differences
among foreign experts on the PRC. 277 At a time when “engagement” with the
PRC is viewed with an increasingly skeptical eye, 278 the path to interact with
entities in the PRC without being labeled a naïve panda-hugger is likewise
increasingly fraught. If engagement becomes conflated with complicity—a
panda-helper as well as hugger—it risks pushing Americans to establish bona
fides as “tough on China” to ameliorate concerns about their loyalties.
American experts on the PRC should be tough on the PRC party-state if their
analysis leads them to that conclusion, not because of the need to signal
loyalties to the home team. It bears remembering that President Richard
274

See Emily Feng, American Graduates of China’s Yenching Academy are Being
Questioned by the FBI, NPR (Aug. 1, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/08/01/746355146/american-graduates-of-chinas-yenching-academy-are-beingquestioned-by-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/D9UE-LBDN] (“One of the agents asked if anyone in
China had tried to recruit [Yale student Brian Kim] for espionage efforts.”).
275
Rosie Levine, Why is the FBI Investigating Americans Who Study in China?,
CHINAFILE (Sep. 13, 2019), https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/why-fbi-investigatingamericans-who-study-china [https://perma.cc/E7XM-2CJD].
276
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former CIA Officer Sentenced to Prison for
Espionage (May 17, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cia-officer-sentencedprison-espionage [https://perma.cc/B5ZQ-7VNM].
277
Rob Gifford, Panda-Huggers and Dragon-Slayers: How to View Modern China
Today, NAT’L COUNCIL SOC. STUD. (Jan./Feb. 2010), https://www.socialstudies.org/socialeducation/74/1/panda-huggers-publications/socialeducation/januaryfebruary2010/pandahuggers_and-dragon-slayers-how-view-modern-china-today
[https://perma.cc/88T2-ZD2K].
278
See, e.g., Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied
American Expectations, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning [https://perma.cc/KGM5-962D] (“Neither carrots
nor sticks have swayed China as predicted. Diplomatic and commercial engagement have not
brought political and economic openness.”).
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Nixon, who normalized relations with the PRC, “arguably was the only U.S.
politician who could have gotten away with such a bold move. He had the
right-wing credentials, as an anti-communist and advocate of Taiwan.” 279
The DOJ’s depictions of non-ethnically Chinese, non-PRC citizens
further creates tropes of formerly law-abiding Americans being seduced by
slick PRC operatives who appeal to greed. 280 The 2014 FBI film, “Game of
Pawns,” has a White protagonist who is recruited by PRC operatives to seek
a position with the CIA. 281 “The Company Man” also dramatizes a White
protagonist who is lured by money from PRC nationals. 282 Depicting people
who do not present as ethnically Chinese as pawns does not diminish
concerns about the framing of a China threat but rather creates another layer:
that part of the DOJ’s narrative is the presence of a stealthy “China” operating
behind the scenes and corrupting Americans. There are ways to construct
briefings for the business community and predeparture seminars for
American students headed abroad that alert them to concerns—ranging from
possible recruitment as spies to compliance with the country’s drug laws—
without stoking fears or stereotypes.
When announcing charges against a “Harvard University Professor and
Two Chinese Nationals” in January 2020, the FBI Special Agent in charge
remarked, “[a]ll three individuals charged today are manifestations of the
China threat.” 283 This “China” of the China Initiative has become an “it”
with, as described by Attorney General Barr, a bold historical and current
ambition: “Centuries before communism, China regarded itself as the central
kingdom, Zhongguo. And it wasn’t central to the region. It was central to the
world. And its ambition today is not to be a regional power, but a global
one.” 284
Operating within a framework that is seen as countering China’s
ambition muddles the individualized lens through which federal prosecutors
should approach a decision whether to commence prosecution: the belief
279
David Ignatius, Nixon’s Great Decision on China, 40 Years Later, WASH. POST (Feb.
10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nixons-great-decision-on-china-40years-later/2012/02/10/gIQAtFh34Q_story.html [https://perma.cc/CW6A-VJBR].
280
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 67 (“Amanda was pretty and smart, but we
never went beyond being friends.”).
281
Id.
282
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 66.
283
Bonavolonta, supra note 140.
284
Barr, supra note 4 (emphasis added). But see Kaiser Kuo, Kuora: Three Common
Misconceptions About China, SUPCHINA (June 25, 2018), https://supchina.com/2018/06/25/k
uora-three-common-misconceptions-about-china/ [https://perma.cc/HXR8-ADJY] (“China is
certainly guilty of a kind of civilizational arrogance, but the notion that it has always regarded
itself as the center of the universe and that even its very name implied this is just incorrect.”).
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“that a person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.” 285 Not only is an
associational stigma attaching to persons exhibiting China-ness, this framing
is in tension with fundamental principles undergirding why the DOJ should
seek to prove criminal liability and recommend punishment.
IV. PUNISHING CHINA
With the China Initiative giving shape to a China threat that spans
government, party, nationality, ethnicity, and even broader contacts, the
question is then whether this is a good thing. If the perspective is a blunt
national security assessment that there are threats emanating from the PRC
party-state and it is better to err heavily on the side of being overinclusive,
then the U.S. government can try to make this case. For instance, the U.S.
government argued during the post-9/11 “war on terror” that laws against
torture should bend to national security concerns. 286 The DOJ is not making
this case. Rather, it is positioning the China Initiative as appropriately
striking the balance between being wary of the PRC party-state while not
unfairly encompassing people who have some sort of ties to “China.”
If we shift the perspective from a national security assessment to how
we understand the traditional drivers behind prosecutions, then a different
analysis is warranted. The DOJ has tremendous power to prosecute
individuals such that, if convicted, they will be subject to punishment. 287
What are the guiding principles for prosecutors and how does the China
Initiative stand up when evaluated against these principles?
This Part takes questions usually focused on individual defendants (e.g.,
how might prosecuting this person deter potential criminal conduct?) and
also asks them of the China Initiative as a whole (e.g., how might the China
Initiative deter potential criminal conduct?). It argues that having prosecution
285

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 25, at 9-27.220 (emphasis added).
S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 143–44 (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A6D9FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZYC-7LN3] (“The presentation [by CIA officials] warned National
Security Council principals in attendance that ‘termination of this program will result in loss
of life, possibly extensive.’ The CIA officers further noted that . . . ’major threats were
countered and attacks averted’ because of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation
techniques.’”). See generally JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING
AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2012) (assessing the United States’
interconnected global detention system after 9/11 including reliance on memos limiting
definition of torture).
287
Cf. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4–5 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the
nature of punishment).
286
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and punishment rest in part on a connection with “China” is worrisome when
assessed in light of the goals of deterrence (Part IV.A), incapacitation (Part
IV.B), rehabilitation (Part IV.C), and retribution (Part IV.D).
Based on this assessment, a better path is for the DOJ to discard the
China Initiative framing, focus on cases’ individual characteristics, and draw
on outside expertise so that removing the initiative’s name is accompanied
by real changes in practice (Part IV.E).
A. DETERRENCE

A slide in a DOJ presentation on the China Initiative lists reasons “Why
Prosecutions Matter,” 288 including “[d]eter others (change cost-benefit
calculation of leadership and thieves/hackers).” 289 Deterrence is thus
presented on two levels: the individual human level (the “thieves/hackers”)
and the PRC party-state level (the “leadership”).
Deterrence is a central pillar of a utilitarian view of punishment.290 Put
simply, punishing the individual has benefits for society as a whole.
Reducing the future prevalence, severity, or both of criminal activities can
occur on the individual level (i.e., specific deterrence) 291 or more broadly in
society (i.e., general deterrence). 292 An unshakeable challenge of deterrence
theory, whether specific or general, is that we cannot prove in practice what
we hope is the case in theory. 293 Research has shown that the probability of
detection, prosecution, and punishment are factors in achieving deterrence,
288

“The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20.
289
Id.
290
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 69 (2005) (“Utilitarian
purposes and limitations seek to achieve beneficial effects (or a net benefit) and, in particular,
lower frequency and/or seriousness of future criminal acts by this offender or others.”); see
also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999)
(“By ‘deterrence’ I intend to refer broadly to the consequentialist theory . . . that depicts
punishment as a policy aimed at creating efficient behavioral incentives.”).
291
See Frase, supra note 288, at 70.
292
Id. at 71 (citing FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 72–73 (1973)).
293
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1517 (1974) (“[w]hether
punishment deters certain kinds of crimes at all, whether more severe penalties produce greater
deterrence, even these basic questions cannot be answered with confidence.”); Kahan, supra
note 290, at 416 (“Empirically, deterrence claims are speculative.”); R. W. Burnham, Review
of “Deterrence. By Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon J. Hawkins”, 16 BRITISH J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 403, 403 (1976) (“For as long as I have been involved in the field, I have heard
both professionals and laymen in criminal justice, practitioners and observers, offer assertive,
indeed would-be definitive opinions on the value, presence, absence or whatever of deterrence,
and have felt uneasy about it.”).
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as compared with focusing solely on the severity of punishment. 294 That
people regularly depart from being rational actors further complicates the
equation. 295
Beginning on the individual level, decreasing recidivism of people
charged as part of the China Initiative does not appear to be a central
motivation. Once a person has been exposed for stealing intellectual property
or failing to disclose ties to the PRC, it is unlikely—absent a serious lapse in
a company’s or university’s due diligence—that she would once again be
allowed in a position with the access required to commit a similar offense.
Accordingly, punishing a person who engaged in intellectual-property theft
or made false statements today does not seem necessary to stop future
transgressions by the same person. Experiencing punishment could well give
such person pause before reengaging in similar conduct for fear of future
punishment, but other external barriers kick in that do not apply, for example,
if a person who is punished for burglary is again out in public with easy
access to homes.
The China Initiative is instead aimed at general deterrence. It seeks to
discourage possible offenders from committing crimes in the first place out
of fear that they will face a similar end as defendants like Dr. Lieber.296 Such
an example could deter someone who has already engaged in illegal behavior
(e.g., lying about connections to the PRC party-state or even currently
stealing intellectual property) to cease those activities. It could also raise
awareness among people who are leading completely crime-free lives that
connections with the PRC party-state should be done with caution and that,
“[w]hile association with a Talent Program is not illegal, it can create

294

See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 135, at 43 (“[C]ertainty of punishment matters more
than severity for deterrence.”); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of
Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 741 (1989)
(“[O]ur findings suggest that both the certainty and severity of punishment are
deterrents . . . .”).
295
Cf. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 782–86 (2010) (noting, when explaining
basics of deterrence theory, that it “presumes that human beings are rational enough to
consider the consequences of their actions and to be influenced by those consequences”); Paul
H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling
Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1093 (2010) (“[T]he people most likely to be offenders are the
people who are most likely to be bad calculators, or be indifferent to future consequences.”).
296
Ellen Barry, U.S. Accuses Harvard Scientist of Concealing Chinese Funding, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/us/charles-lieber-harvard.html
[https://perma.cc/VW4Y-9MYY] (Dr. Lieber could receive up to five years in prison if
convicted of making a false or misleading statement regarding his involvement in the
Thousand Talents plan.); U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 92.

2021]

CRIMINALIZING CHINA

203

incentives to steal, violate export controls, or cause a failure to disclose
conflicts of interest/foreign funding.” 297
The “failure to disclose conflicts” component of the China Initiative
deserves emphasis because it sweeps in a much broader range of potential
defendants than crimes that are more blatantly nefarious like stealing a
competitor’s robot technology. The DOJ’s “Justice Manual,” which contains
essential guidance for prosecutors, includes as a reason not to commence
prosecution that “there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution.” 298 Casting a wide net of criminal charges chafes against this
constraint. If increased auditing and transparency requirements could achieve
the same or similar deterrence of misbehavior, then perhaps a harsh response
using criminal laws is overkill.
The DOJ has taken the stance that criminal prosecutions play a
beneficial role. For example, Andrew Lelling said in February 2020 of letters
from the NIH to grantee institutions with questionable contacts in the PRC,
“I think those letters have had an in terrorem effect . . . . And that’s good,
because you want a little bit of fear out there to sensitize people to the
magnitude of the problem.” 299 The high-profile prosecutions and push to
reach the corporate and academic worlds through briefings certainly heighten
awareness of the threats that the China Initiative seeks to mitigate. 300 As
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated in 1881, “[p]revention would . . . seem to
be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment.” 301
What deserves greater scrutiny is whether the China Initiative is
creating overdeterrence. Also in February 2020, Andrew Lelling explained
that “[t]he primary goal of the China Initiative is to sensitize private industry
and academic institutions to this problem [of intellectual-property theft
connected to the PRC]” and that academic institutes might think harder about
collaboration with PRC-linked entities in the future. 302 When asked if this
approach would have a chilling effect on collaboration with Chinese entities,
he responded, “Yes, it will.” 303 In April 2020, Politico reported that George
Varghese, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and current partner at
297
“The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National
Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20.
298
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 25, at 9-27.220.
299
Mervis, supra note 11.
300
Cf. Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 7 (“Broadly speaking, the China Initiative
aims to raise awareness of the threats we face . . . .”).
301
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46 (Little Brown 1991) (1881).
302
Lelling, supra note 103, at 01:22:00.
303
Id. Cf. Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 51, at 460 (“The [Economic Espionage Act]
could, in short, make American universities unattractive to students, post docs, visiting faculty,
and other potential foreign collaborators.”).
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WilmerHale, “said the China Initiative has made some of his clients in
academia rethink their overall approach to working with foreign partners.” 304
An appraisal of the pros and cons of this chilling effect would benefit
from eyes beyond the DOJ. At present, the China Initiative outreach appears
centered on entities that could become victims of, or accomplices to, crimes.
Efforts to quantify the benefits of connectivity between the United States and
PRC—including the flow of people, information, and money—are needed to
better calibrate when deterrence could place the United States in a worse
competitive position vis-à-vis the PRC. As an example of how outside
expertise could be valuable in this process, in June 2020, MacroPolo
launched a “Global AI Talent Tracker,” with a key takeaway that “China is
the largest source of top-tier AI researchers, but a majority of these Chinese
researchers leave China to study, work, and live in the United States.” 305 In
July 2020, Attorney General Barr warned of the PRC’s advances in AI,
adding “[w]hichever nation emerges as the global leader in AI will be best
positioned to unlock not only its considerable economic potential, but a range
of military applications, such as the use of computer vision to gather
intelligence.” 306 Yet an overzealous China Initiative could actually impede
the United States’ prospects for emerging as this global leader.
An additional level of outreach would be to involve criminologists who
are skilled at trying to disentangle the forces behind deterrence. Because
deterrence is impossible to measure precisely, even close coordination
between the DOJ and independent criminologists is unlikely to yield an
agreed upon sweet spot whereby crimes are deterred while productive
collaboration continues. It is no easy feat to stop hackers from grabbing
COVID-19 research—as announced in a July 2020 indictment 307—while also
encouraging cross-border scientific partnerships to find a vaccine. But
working with criminologists could shine at least some light on the ways in
which the initiative might squelch collaboration that could benefit the United

304

Swan, supra note 104.
Ishan Banerjee & Matt Sheehan, America’s Got AI Talent: US’ Big Lead in AI
Research Is Built on Importing Researchers, MACROPOLO (June 9, 2020), https://macropolo
.org/americas-got-ai-talent-us-big-lead-in-ai-research-is-built-on-importing-researchers/
[https://perma.cc/7GPC-9PES].
306
See Barr, supra note 166.
307
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Two Chinese Hackers Working with the Ministry
of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign Targeting Intellectual
Property and Confidential Business Information, Including COVID-19 Research (July 21,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-securitycharged-global-computer-intrusion [https://perma.cc/6NEG-TJDK].
305
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States’ economic health as well as, in the age of COVID-19, its citizens’
actual physical health. 308
Avoiding altogether the expansive China threat as currently depicted by
the DOJ requires that researchers steer clear of an array of people and entities
with some connection to the PRC. Although it is true that the PRC party-state
reaches into companies and universities within the PRC in a far deeper and
wider manner than does the U.S. government in the United States, this does
not meld the party-state, business world, and academia into a monolithic
entity. Nor do all parts of PRC universities raise national security concerns.
For instance, in April 2019, the U.S. government added Renmin University
and Tongji University, two prestigious PRC universities, to the “unverified
list” used as part of the government’s system for export controls. 309 The list
does not look at those universities on a granular level, meaning discussions
on criminal justice reforms with Renmin’s law school are subject to enhanced
concern along with areas like the physics department, which is much more
likely to house sensitive technologies.
A related issue that has not been adequately explored is that the China
Initiative might not only deter productive exchanges that would benefit U.S.
innovation but perhaps encourage the very problem that the China Initiative
was created to address. The utilitarian goal of deterrence is rooted in the
premise that “[c]riminal penalties should not cost more than the benefits they
achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their crimecontrolling effects or other benefits.” 310 The FBI warns of “[a]ppeals to
ethnicity or nationality (for example, common ethnic heritage or dual
citizenship)” as a technique used by the PRC party-state to enlist the
assistance of academics. 311 If these appeals are actually working—a point

308
Cf. Andrew Silver, Scientists in China Say US Government Crackdown is Harming
Collaborations, NATURE (July 8, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02015y [https://perma.cc/9VNP-AE2E] (“Researchers in both countries say that US policies . . . are
also having a chilling effect on bilateral research partnerships.”).
309
Julian G. Ku, The U.S. Recently Erected a New Hurdle to U.S.-China Academic
Cooperation. Here’s What It Might Mean., CHINAFILE (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/us-recently-erected-new-hurdle-uschina-academic-cooperation-heres-what [https://perma.cc/9J2P-SQ8R]; see also Revisions to
the Unverified List (UVL), 84 Fed. Reg. 14,608 (Apr. 11, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
pt 744).
310
Frase, supra note 290, at 72 (citing Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89
MINN. L. REV. 571, 593–95 (2005)).
311
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 68, at 7.
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that requires greater clarity—does the China Initiative make it easier for the
PRC party-state to tap into nationalism? 312
In contrast to the carrots of money and accolades for assisting the PRC
party-state, another question is how to address the sticks that the party-state
can wield when people have familial or other close ties to the PRC. 313 On the
one hand, the potential for using family as leverage is real. 314 It is a high bar
for a defendant in federal court to prevail on a duress defense, 315 though
reported retaliation against family within the PRC of dissidents abroad raises
concerns about how the PRC party-state might exploit vulnerabilities. 316
Even if not rising to such extreme pressure, the already murky calculation of
deterrence is even more complicated when a person is weighing not just the
potential for apprehension and punishment by U.S. authorities but also the
concern that going against the PRC party-state could have negative
repercussions for people they care about who are living in the PRC.

312
For a thoughtful discussion of nationalism in the PRC see Ian Johnson, China, Where
State Pomp Comes With Real Feeling, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/10/03/opinion/china-national-day-.html [https://perma.cc/G9PH-E2ZQ]. For PRC’s
officials’ awareness of the increased scrutiny of PRC-connected scientists, see Zhenhua Lu &
Catherine Wong, Senior Chinese Diplomat Warns of ‘Disastrous Consequences’ If US Treats
China as ‘Enemy’, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 8, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news
/china/diplomacy/article/3017772/senior-chinese-diplomat-warns-disastrous-consequencesif-us [https://perma.cc/GM4K-M7XH] (“There are some reports saying that some ChineseAmerican scientists in the US, just because they are Chinese scientists, they have been treated
unfairly.”).
313
See, e.g., China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-governmentthreats-academic-freedom-abroad [https://perma.cc/V287-LPNW] (“Academics told Human
Rights Watch that students from China have described threats to their families in China in
response to what those students had said in the classroom.”).
314
It is also well documented that the PRC party-state has taken negative actions against
family members of people who are within the PRC and seen as opposed to the party-state’s
interests. See, e.g., Sophie Richardson, Chinese Authorities Torment Activist’s Dying Mother,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 1, 2020, 1:16 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/01
/chinese-authorities-torment-activists-dying-mother [https://perma.cc/PVR3-QQUS]; Jerome
Cohen, Who Gets Punished? Sons and Daughters of Rights Lawyers - Collective Punishment
in China, JERRY’S BLOG (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/
2015/10/20/who-gets-punished-sons-and-daughters-of-rights-lawyers-collectivepunishment-in-china [https://perma.cc/UF3J-6XFG].
315
See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (1984) (explaining
three elements: “(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded
fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the
threatened harm”).
316
Cf. William Yang, How China Intimidates Uighurs Abroad by Threatening Their
Families, DW (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-intimidates-uighursabroad-by-threatening-their-families/a-49554977 [https://perma.cc/PU6E-ZYNW].
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On the other hand, the mere fact that people have family ties to the PRC
should not, standing alone, be reason for the U.S. government to consider a
person untrustworthy. An example from the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) is instructive even if not directly relevant to the DOJ.
Based on an analysis of more than 26,000 security clearance decisions by
DOHA from 1996 through October 2019, Bloomberg reported, “[t]he idea
that having friends or family in China makes Chinese Americans vulnerable
to coercion by Chinese agents, directly or through their loved ones, is a
premise of most of DOHA’s China-linked denials. In [DOHA Judge Noreen]
Lynch’s 12-page ruling, the word ‘coercion’ appears 11 times.” 317 As the
writer and physicist Yangyang Cheng has observed, “With their ethnicity
appropriated by both governments, Chinese people in the U.S. are doublevictimized, by an overreaching ancestral homeland on one side of the Pacific
and a paranoid Washington establishment on the other.” 318
Lumping people together because of a perceived shared China-ness
diverts from the individualized focus that should be the centerpiece not only
of criminal prosecutions but also of security decisions. A tendency toward
categorical thinking of members of a group (e.g., based on race or ethnicity)
can be mitigated by learning to individuate people, but this requires
conscious work. 319 It also requires time and resources to make more finegrained, individualized determinations rather than using proxies like
ethnicity and nationality to estimate risks.
In light of the multiple layers of influences on human behavior, the DOJ
should seek to thread the needle of sensitizing academia and the private
sector to the vulnerability of their intellectual property while not depicting
the sources of that vulnerability in ways that alienates—and even
aggravates—any entities that possess China-ness. To date, instead of trying
to excise actors engaged in criminal conduct with a scalpel, the rhetoric
surrounding the China Initiative indicates an intent to excavate any PRClinked influence. The Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center introduced a circular diagram of the “PRC’s Tools for
Acquiring Technology” (ranging from “intelligence services” to “academic
317

Peter Waldman, Mistrust and the Hunt for Spies Among Chinese Americans,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-1210/the-u-s-government-s-mistrust-of-chinese-americans [https://perma.cc/LL5M-KTAD].
318
Yangyang Cheng, Field of Dreams, SUPCHINA, (May 27, 2020), https://sup
china.com/2020/05/27/field-of-dreams/ [https://perma.cc/3UQA-WYMX].
319
See, e.g., Kurt Hugenberg, Jennifer Miller, & Heather M. Claypool, Categorization
and Individuation in the Cross-Race Recognition Deficit: Toward a Solution to an Insidious
Problem, 43 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PYSCH. 334, 340 (2007) (“[T]he current experiments
suggest a relatively simple way to reduce the [Cross-Race Effect]: inform people of the bias
and motivate them to individuate out-group members.”).

208

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

collaboration” and “research partnerships”) by remarking, “[w]e call this the
wheel of doom.” 320 This rhetoric coupled with an emphasis on criminal
prosecutions as a method for sending broad warnings means that the safe
route is for researchers to avoid projects with links to the PRC. It also means
that scientists who themselves possess China-ness may conclude that it is
prudent to remain distant from the U.S. government and, at an extreme, even
from the United States itself. 321 Furthermore, the very people who best
understand how the PRC party-state works and have the linguistic and
cultural competencies to bring greater precision to the DOJ’s efforts are the
same people who are swept within the description of the threat. 322
As noted above, 323 DOJ officials intersperse reassurances that the China
Initiative is not aimed at people because they are Chinese: “The FBI is now
investigating China-related cases in all 50 states . . . . But let me be crystal
clear: we are not suggesting that all, or even most, Chinese students and
visitors are somehow up to no good.” 324 Such statements do not remedy the
problem. Vastly ramping up the scope and scale of investigations under the
China Initiative speaks louder than words. Moreover, rote interjections
denying that people who possess China-ness are under enhanced scrutiny act
as microinvalidations. 325 Intermittently telling people of PRC nationality,
320

Evanina, supra note 164, at 15:00.
See, e.g., David Armstrong, Annie Waldman, & Daniel Golden, Hounded Out of U.S.,
Scientist Invents Fast Coronavirus Test in China, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Hounded-Out-of-US-Scientist/248262
[https://perma.cc/8U9R-D9NA] (positing that Weihong Tan, the researcher who developed a
COVID-19 test after leaving the United States for China, “is a stark example of the intellectual
firepower fleeing the U.S. as a result of a Trump administration crackdown on university
researchers with ties to China”).
322
Cf. Waldman, supra note 315 (analysis of more than 26,000 security clearance
decisions for federal contractors since 1996: “From 2000 through 2009, clearance applicants
with connections to China—such as family or financial relationships—were denied Pentagon
clearances at the same rate as applicants with links to all other countries: 44%. But from 2010
through Oct. 31 [2019], the China-related denial rate jumped to 61%, and the rate for all other
countries fell to 34%.”).
323
See, e.g., Evanina, supra note 164, at 18:00.
324
Bonavolonta, supra note 140.
325
Kevin C. Nadal, A Guide to Responding to Microaggressions, 2 CUNY F. 71, 71
(2014) (“Microinvalidations are verbal statements that deny, negate, or undermine the realities
of members of various target groups. For example, when a white person tells a person of color
that racism does not exist, she or he is invalidating and denying the person of color’s racial
reality. Similarly, when someone tells a woman that she is ‘being too sensitive,’ or that an
LGBT person ‘should stop complaining,’ they invalidate the reality of discrimination in these
people’s lives.”); see also Derald Wing Sue, Christina M. Capodilupo, Gina C. Torino,
Jennifer M. Bucceri, Aisha M. B. Holder, Kevin L. Nadal, and Marta Esquilin, Racial
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Chinese ethnicity, or both that the China Initiative is not aimed at them
invalidates their lived experience in the United States today.
In addition to these concerns about how deterrence theory applies on the
individual human level, the China Initiative is also concerning when viewed
from its goal of deterring the larger entity of the PRC party-state. Criminal
law deterrence theory is not generally thought in terms of changing the
calculations of a government, yet, as FBI Director Wray stated at a February
2020 conference on the China Initiative, “[w]e’ve seen how our criminal
indictments have rallied other nations to our cause, which is crucial to
persuading the Chinese government to change its behavior.” 326
Deterrence theory in the different context of international relations has
a long history. Michael J. Mazarr at the Rand Corporation wrote in 2018,
“[t]he challenge of deterrence—discouraging states from taking unwanted
actions, especially military aggression—has again become a principal theme
in U.S. defense policy.” 327 In describing how various executive-branch
agencies are part of the “whole-of-government push back against China,” 328
Satoru Mori notes how the U.S. government’s current approach toward the
PRC is “based on the notion that inducements cannot bring about positive
change in Chinese behavior and policy.” 329 In other words, the U.S.
government is putting greater emphasis on sticks (e.g., prosecutions) over
carrots (e.g., friendly gestures of working together on protection of
intellectual property). Not only is pursuing individual prosecutions as an
attempt to change the behavior of the PRC party-state like using an ice pick
to break up a glacier, scrutinizing individual criminal liability is
fundamentally different from managing state-to-state relations.
There is no indication that the PRC party-state leadership is reducing
efforts to obtain intellectual property in violation of U.S. laws because
individual people are being punished under the China Initiative. There are,
however, intimations that the PRC is revising its own Criminal Law with the
Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCH. 271,
274–75 (2007)] (“Microinvalidations are characterized by communications that exclude,
negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of
color. When Asian Americans (born and raised in the United States) are complimented for
speaking good English or are repeatedly asked where they were born, the effect is to negate
their U.S. American heritage and to convey that they are perpetual foreigners.”).
326
Wray, supra note 4.
327
MICHAEL J. MAZARR, UNDERSTANDING DETERRENCE 1 (2018), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XMB-WMW7].
328
Satoru Mori, US Technological Competition with China: The Military, Industrial and
Digital Network Dimensions, 26 ASIA-PAC. REV. 77, 78 (2019).
329
Id. at 79.
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China Initiative in mind: amendments adopted in December 2020 include the
possibility of five or more years’ imprisonment if “commercial secrets are
stolen, spied upon, sold, or illegally provided to overseas institutions,
organizations, or persons.” 330 Mark Cohen at China IPR blog points out
differences between this provision and “economic espionage” under U.S. law
but explains how commentators have suggested the amendment is “a ‘tit for
tat’ provision in retaliation for US economic espionage cases.” 331 Ironically,
the United States had previously pushed the PRC to increase criminal
penalties for intellectual property infringements, as seen in a 2007 WTO
complaint against the PRC. 332
If the argument is that prosecutions build solidarity with like-minded
countries and then, in turn, the resulting multilateral effort (as compared with
direct pressure by the United States alone) is what will deter PRC party-state
directed crimes, 333 then the DOJ should substantiate how that chain of
influence is indeed happening. In his July 2020 speech on U.S. policy toward
China, Secretary of State Pompeo proposed, “Maybe it’s time for a new
grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.” 334 Whether
the now Biden administration can rally this grouping and have it change the
PRC leadership’s behavior is yet to be clearly articulated let alone seen.
Not only is an initiative aimed at deterring China through prosecuting
individuals a departure from the DOJ’s usual work, the emphasis on China
as the bad actor can create tunnel vision. When Mike Bloomberg entered the
race for president, recordings surfaced of him defending his stop-and-frisk
policy while New York City mayor:

330

P.R.C. Criminal Law Amendment 11, China Law Translate (Dec. 26, 2020),
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/criminal-law-amendment-11/ [https://perma.cc/F2LPHGZ9]; Criminal Law Amendment (XI), NPC Observer (last visited Jan. 20, 2021),
https://npcobserver.com/legislation/criminal-law-amendment-xi/
[https://perma.cc/F98C8J2D].
331
Mark Cohen, Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Code on Trade Secrets, CHINA
IPR (July 13, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/07/13/proposed-amendments-to-the-criminalcode-on-trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/P992-2EP4].
332
See generally Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: Evaluating the U.S.-China
WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, (2008) (evaluating U.S.
complaint alleging the PRC violated its obligations under TRIPS to provide adequate
protection for and deterrence against infringing intellectual property rights).
333
See Wray, supra note 4 (“We’ve seen how our criminal indictments have rallied other
nations to our cause, which is crucial to persuading the Chinese government to change its
behavior.”).
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Pompeo, supra note 7.
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[People say] “you are arresting kids for marijuana that are all minorities.” Yes, that’s
true. Why? Because we put all the cops in minority neighborhoods. Yes, that’s true.
Why do we do it? Because that’s where all the crime is. 335

By criminalizing China, the DOJ has similarly made a decision that
resources should be directed at entities with China-ness because, “that’s
where all the crime is.” John Demers reported in December 2018 that,
“[f]rom 2011[–]2018, more than 90 percent of the Department’s cases
alleging economic espionage by or to benefit a state involve China, and more
than two-thirds of the Department’s theft of trade secrets cases have had a
nexus to China.” 336 To what extent is this percentage increasing now that
resources are explicitly directed at a China threat? 337 And to what extent are
foreign governments other than the PRC aware that they are not the focus of
the DOJ’s efforts? 338 In short, is there underdeterrence of actors who do not
have a nexus to the PRC? That in July 2020 Attorney General Barr provided
the following, slightly different numbers without any mention of the time
period covered underscores the need for greater clarity: “About 80% of all
federal economic espionage prosecutions have alleged conduct that would
benefit the Chinese state, and about 60% of all trade secret theft cases have
had a nexus to China.” 339
To be sure, the DOJ can walk and chew gum at the same time. The
China Initiative does not mean that DOJ has entirely taken its eye off other
potential sources of threats. Nevertheless, constructing a massive initiative
around a particularly defined threat will at least deflect some energy from
other potential investigations. To justify the China Initiative framing based
on a deterrence rationale requires the DOJ to demonstrate that it is not only
335

Elliot Hannon, Leaked Audio Captures Bloomberg Defending Racial Profiling and
Stop-and-Frisk Policing, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/02/leaked-audio-bloomberg-aspen-institute-racial-profiling-stop-and-friskpolicing.html [https://perma.cc/QPT9-RDY4].
336
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5.
337
Cf. 2018 Foreign Economic Espionage in CyberSpace, NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
& SEC. CTR. (July 26, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-newsroom/item/
1889-2018-foreign-economic-espionage-in-cyberspace
[https://perma.cc/9F63-U2MK]
(“The report also provides insights into the most pervasive nation-state threat actors –
including China, Russia and Iran . . . .”); Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 51, at 422–23 (noting
USTR watch list of countries included China, India, and Thailand).
338
Cf. Press release, U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Releases Annual Special 301 Report on
Intellectual Property Protection and Review of Notorious Markets for Piracy and
Counterfeiting (Apr. 25, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2019/april/ustr-releases-annual-special-301
[https://perma.cc/Q2Y7-6GK4]
(“Trading partners that currently present the most significant concerns regarding IP rights are
placed on the Priority Watch List or Watch List. USTR identified 36 countries for these lists
in the Special 301 Report . . . .”).
339
Barr, supra note 166.
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effective in changing the behavior of the PRC leadership and individual
“thieves/hackers,” 340 but also that the downsides (e.g., potential
overdeterrence of contacts with the PRC and underdeterrence of criminal
activity without a nexus to the PRC) do not outweigh the upsides.
B. INCAPACITATION

A second pillar of utilitarian justifications for punishment is
incapacitation. 341 This logic is simple enough on an individual level: lock a
person behind bars and he cannot, or at least it will be very difficult to,
commit crimes outside of those bars. The benefits to society from increasing
incarceration levels is, however, contested. 342 Various degrees of
incapacitation can also be achieved through restrictions on a person’s
activities via electronic or other monitoring. 343
For the intellectual property thefts at the heart of the China Initiative,
exposure is often tantamount to incapacitation. Keeping a person who has
been accused of making false statements on research grants or stealing trade
secrets away from opportunities to recommit similar crimes does not require
prison. It requires transparent, accessible records such that anyone who is
considering again putting that person in a position in which those crimes can
occur simply will deny access. 344 For example, Robert Mo was sentenced to
thirty-six months in prison for conspiracy to steal trade secrets. 345 Once his
activities to obtain corn-seed technology were exposed, it became doubtful
340

U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 20.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (8th ed. 2018) (“Quite simply,
[the defendant’s] imprisonment prevents him from committing crimes in the outside society
during the period of segregation.”).
342
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 14 (1995) (analyzing the justifications for
incapacitation and explaining its appeal as partly that “restraint from future crime operates as
a concrete justification for imprisonment . . . .”); Shawn D. Bushway, Evaluating
Realignment: What Do We Learn About the Impact of Incarceration on Crime?, 15
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 309, 313 (2016) (in analyzing data on the impact of California’s
reduction of its prison population, disagreeing that studies showed “that incapacitation as a
strategy is fundamentally flawed”).
343
See, e.g., PEW, USE OF ELECTRONIC OFFENDER-TRACKING DEVICES EXPANDS SHARPLY
3 (2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-ofelectronic-offender-tracking-devices-expands-sharply
[https://perma.cc/M3SS-ZLGV]
(“Nationally, nearly 7 million people were in prison or jail or on probation or parole at the end
of 2014, but individuals tracked using electronic devices in 2015 represented less than 2
percent of that total.”).
344
Longer-term incapacitation is, admittedly, harder to achieve for cyber-criminals as
they could access sensitive information remotely in addition to actually inserting a USB flash
drive into a computer or other technique that requires physical proximity.
345
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 145.
341
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that imprisoning him was needed to stop him from committing further thefts.
And, as a PRC national, he was scheduled to be removed from the United
States after completing his sentence. 346 He will thus be incapacitated from
physical activities within the United States. Aside from any valuable
information that he has stored in his brain, he will not be of use to actors in
the PRC who might want to engage in intellectual-property theft in the future.
Similarly, incapacitation is not a compelling justification for the China
Initiative when viewed on the level of the PRC party-state. Of course, the
United States cannot incapacitate “China” in the sense of putting this
construct behind bars, but it can try to contain the PRC in various ways. The
United States can go beyond deterring interactions between U.S.-based and
PRC-based entities to actually disallowing those interactions. For example,
the U.S. government can place certain PRC universities and individuals on
the “Denied Person List” or “Entity List,” which would drastically curtail
and even entirely cut off interactions. 347
Discussions regarding “decoupling” various facets of the U.S.–PRC
relationship also move toward incapacitation. 348 Congressional action is
necessary to change laws that lean toward decoupling. For example,
regulations became effective in February 2020 implementing the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), which
“strengthens and modernizes [the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States, CFIUS] to address national security concerns more
effectively . . . .” 349 While it cannot enact laws or investment regulations, the
DOJ can play a critical role in supporting efforts to limit activities with PRClinked entities. The China Initiative Fact Sheet includes implementing
FIRRMA as a component, 350 and, in April 2019, the Deputy Attorney
General of the National Security Division’s remarks at a conference on
CFIUS began by referencing the China Initiative, emphasizing the need to
“broaden our approach,” and recognizing that “criminal prosecution alone is

346

HVISTENDAHL, supra note 191, at 255 (“In January 2019, Robert wrote me that his
sentence was almost completed and he would soon be deported.”).
347
Ku, supra note 309.
348
See Lindsey W. Ford, Refocusing the China Debate: American Allies and the Question
of U.S.-China “Decoupling”, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/07/refocusing-the-china-debate-american-allies-and-thequestion-of-us-china-decoupling/ [https://perma.cc/UF8C-L3WF].
349
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreigninvestment-in-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/QH72-96HW].
350
CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
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not enough to remediate the harm caused by theft or to deter future
thieves.” 351
Just as with overdeterrence, the current discussions surrounding the
China Initiative would benefit from wrestling with the potential for overincapacitation. Greater outside expertise is crucial in finding the balance
between protecting sensitive technologies while still welcoming productive
investment. The Rhodium Group has advised, “[i]t is therefore in the interest
of the United States to better understand the nature of these inflows [from the
PRC] and how to interpret them, in order to secure the benefits while
continuing to manage any traditional or new forms of potential associated
risk.” 352
Over-incapacitation further risks cutting off channels of communication
between the United States and PRC that can provide valuable information. In
advising Congress that the United States should work with the PRC on setting
artificial-intelligence standards, Samm Sacks explained in March 2020,
“[t]here is a national security risk if we do decouple with China and lose
visibility into the way they are thinking about these issues.” 353 In the realm
of legal issues, the U.S.-China Legal Experts Dialogue was last held in
2015, 354 and the Trump administration’s intended annual U.S.-China Law
Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue was held only once in 2017. 355
These dialogues give a mere limited window into the PRC leadership’s
thinking, and the PRC-side is also responsible for their demise, but combined
with informal channels they can provide at least a more textured
understanding of the other side. In contrast, when walls are built, risks
increase that the China Initiative will be based on conjecture about the
thinking in Beijing rather than concrete information.

351

U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 196.
Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese Investment in the United States; Recent
Trends and the Policy Agenda, RHODIUM GRP. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://home.treasury.gov
/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius
[https://perma.cc/5ZMQ-3WVM].
353
Tim Starks, DOJ Talks Breaches, Cyber Command Talks Size, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2020,
10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-cybersecurity/2020/03/05/dojtalks-breaches-cyber-command-talks-size-785882 [https://perma.cc/AQY4-4FBJ].
354
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The 7th U.S.-China Legal Experts Dialogue,
(Oct. 14, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/10/248211.htm [https://perma
.cc/4TG9-LZQJ].
355
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and
Cybersecurity Dialogue, (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china-lawenforcement-and-cybersecurity-dialogue [https://perma.cc/87FG-T3JU]; Shannon Tiezzi,
Another U.S.-China Dialogue Bites the Dust, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 2, 2018), https://thediplomat.
com/2018/10/another-us-china-dialogue-bites-the-dust/ [https://perma.cc/V93W-QQ4W].
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C. REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation is another forward-looking goal of punishment: the
criminal can be made to no longer pose a threat to society and, perhaps, even
to live a “flourishing and successful” life. 356 Academics and policymakers
have long debated the efficacy of rehabilitative efforts. 357 On the individual
level in the China Initiative, the standard rehabilitative programs such as
mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and “[e]ncouraging
inmates to develop marketable job skills” 358 do not seem particularly
applicable to typical defendants. A scientist or professor is not in need of
education programs, and a PRC national who will be removed upon release
has no need to be equipped “with information and resources as they return to
the community.” 359 Nor are there rehabilitative programs that are tailored to
working with people convicted under the umbrella of the China Initiative.
Where the calculation is more interesting is whether China can be
rehabilitated. John Demers said at the Initiative’s launch that the DOJ “will
confront China’s malign behaviors and encourage them to conduct
themselves as they aspire to be: one of the world’s leading nations.” 360 And
one of the Initiative’s goals is to “work to improve Chinese responses to our
requests for assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions under the
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement . . . .” 361 That the China Initiative might
inspire China to greater respect of intellectual property protection through
positive encouragement is not reflected in the Initiative’s implementation to
date. Instead, the thrust is deterrence through punishment.
Past attempts with the current PRC leadership do not bode well that a
more cooperative approach would yield the desired change in behavior. 362
356

MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 234 (1984) (though critiquing the latter
aspect as “paternalistic in character”).
357
See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 315 (2007).
358
Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism By Strengthening the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/prison-reform
[https://perma.cc/7FQN-254G].
359
Id.
360
CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1; see also Statement of Demers, supra note
12, at 2 (“China is instead pursuing its goals through malign behaviors that exploit features
of . . . an open society like ours.”).
361
Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8.
362
See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the
United States (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/
09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states [https://perma.cc/RXG6-GB
KA] (“The United States and China agree that neither country’s government will conduct or
knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property . . . .”).
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The U.S.–PRC relationship is likely going to be contentious in the near future
even with the most adept handling in Washington, D.C. The Trump
administration’s increasingly hard line toward the PRC, as seen in the sudden
closure of a PRC consulate, 363 indicated by the end of President Trump’s
term that the stated cooperative aims of the China Initiative had faded from
view.
Despite the current dark times for U.S–PRC relations, the China
Initiative would benefit from greater consideration of how the strong rhetoric
and enforcement actions today could present challenges to rehabilitating the
U.S.–PRC relationship should a window of opportunity open in the future.
This does not mean that the U.S. government should be soft on the PRC
leadership. It does mean that the U.S. government should compete in a
vigorous and principled manner. It is far easier to label something a threat
than to remove existing stigma. Describing the China Initiative as a response
to a “long-term existential threat” 364 locks the United States into a position
of confrontation with the PRC, rather than exploring how the relationship
might be one of more carefully calibrated rivalry or competition.
The stark us-versus-them framing of the China Initiative further raises
the concern of who will be there to rehabilitate the relationship should the
opportunity arise. In 2009, President Obama announced the “100,000
Strong” initiative to increase the number of Americans studying in China, 365
which was followed by the 2015 “1 Million Strong” initiative that aimed to
bring the total number of students learning Mandarin Chinese in the United
States to one million by 2020. 366 Yet a downturn in foreign language and
regional studies learning that was already apparent during the Obama years
continued under President Trump. 367 Furthermore, in January 2020, the
363
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Briefing With Senior U.S. Government Officials on the
Closure of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, Texas (July 24, 2020), https://www.state.
gov/briefing-with-senior-u-s-government-officials-on-the-closure-of-the-chinese-consulatein-houston-texas/ [https://perma.cc/W8FB-XMCF].
364
Tucker, supra note 35 (quoting William Evanina, then nominee to be director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security).
365
100,000 Strong Educational Exchange Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://20092017.state.gov/100k/index.htm [https://perma.cc/8XRQ-FSRN] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
366
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Can 1 Million American Students Learn Mandarin?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/25/china-us-obamas-onemillion-students-chinese-language-mandarin/; see also 1 Million Strong, US-CHINA STRONG,
https://web.archive.org/web/20190611160254/https://100kstrong.org/initiatives/1-millionstrong/. The initiative’s website is, apparently, no longer operational.
367
Kathleen Stein-Smith, Foreign Language Classes Becoming More Scarce, AM. ACAD.
ARTS AND SCIENCES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.amacad.org/news/foreign-language-classesbecoming-more-scarce [https://perma.cc/SLD9-KCPC]; Tobie Meyer-Fong, America Must
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Peace Corps announced plans to end its China program. 368 This was followed
by an announcement in July 2020 that the U.S. government would end the
Fulbright exchange program with both mainland China and Hong Kong. 369
The decreased emphasis on studying the PRC and the Chinese language is
particularly troubling when coupled with concerns of acquired China-ness.
Rosie Levine, a graduate of Yenching Academy, Peking University, reflected
on the FBI’s interest in her classmates:
When balancing the risk of not obtaining a security clearance against the “safer” option
of learning about China from a textbook, [future China specialists] may decide that the
cost of studying abroad is too high. The chilling effect that FBI questioning has on
young scholars risks alienating a cohort of American citizens best equipped to see our
country through these increasingly challenging times. 370

D. RETRIBUTION

Deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation all aim to bring about
beneficial consequences for society. 371 The China Initiative is problematic
when assessed in terms of whether the United States ultimately comes out
ahead by using that framing. Retribution turns our perspective backward and
rests the justification for punishment on whether the offender deserves it. 372
For individuals sentenced in cases under the China Initiative, that there
is a foreign aspect to the crime can be relevant if the offense for which they
were convicted is traditional or economic espionage. This foreign element
enhances the blameworthiness, though, as with retributive theory more
generally, it is unclear to what extent Congress made that determination
based on increased harm versus moral culpability: “Two basic elements
Invest in Knowledge Infrastructure to Address Global Challenges, THE HILL (Jan. 29, 2020,
6:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/480576-america-must-invest-in-knowled
ge-infrastructure-to-address-global [https://perma.cc/BC6K-NMVS].
368
See Rob Schmitz, Peace Corps to End China Program, NPR (Jan. 24, 2020, 4:19 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/24/799358578/peace-corps-to-end-china-program
[https://perma.cc/A5A5-2TV7].
369
The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, WHITE HOUSE, (July
14, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidents-executive-orderhong-kong-normalization/ [https://perma.cc/YG3F-5JL5].
370
Levine, supra note 275.
371
See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282,
1286–87 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
372
See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179–82 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1891 (1991) (“Retributive justice is nonconsequentialist in that it is
uninterested in influencing the offender’s future behavior or the behavior of other community
members.”).
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determine an offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature and
seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime and the offender’s
degree of culpability in committing the crime.” 373
None of the crimes charged under the China Initiative have China
explicitly stated in the statute, nor does the fact that the foreign government
is the PRC factor into the sentencing guidelines for economic espionage. 374
Yet a 2018 study of economic espionage cases from 1997 to 2015 found that
“Chinese and Asian defendants convicted of espionage crimes received
sentences over twice as long, on average, as defendants with Western names
convicted of espionage crimes.” 375 Questions deserving further study include
(1) has this sentencing discrepancy persisted since 2015 and (2) if so, what
are the possible explanations for the discrepancy aside from the ethnicity and
race of the defendant.
If there is a discrepancy and it cannot be explained by nationality- and
ethnicity-neutral reasons (e.g., the cases with higher sentences involved
thefts of larger value), then what is it about the person’s ethnicity or race that
is prompting a higher sentence? It could be that implicit bias is in play, 376 or
that the defendants are seen as more blameworthy, or that the goal of
deterrence is seen as better achieved through these cases. If the China
Initiative’s emphasis on general deterrence is resulting in longer sentences
for ethnically Chinese defendants, then retribution might actually serve as a
limiting factor by cautioning that these defendants are being punished beyond
what is morally justified.377 In other words, retribution could “tame the utility
monster” 378 of using defendants in the China Initiative as vehicles to warn
the public of the consequences should they engage in similar conduct. 379
373

Frase, supra note 290, at 73 (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
29-33 (1933)); see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and
the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590
(2005).
374
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
2018).
375
Kim, supra note 258, at 793.
376
See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–14
(2005) (explaining how implicit bias works).
377
Cf. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982) (“Desert is not a
defining principle; it is a limiting principle.”); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 66 (1968) (“I see an important limiting principle in the criminal law’s
traditional emphasis on blameworthiness as a prerequisite to the imposition of punishment.”).
378
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (2003) (“The Packer-Morris position sought to tame the utility monster . . . .”).
379
For an example of how retribution can be used as a constraint on punishment, see Brian
M. Murray, Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences, 52 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2020).
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However, if part of the blameworthiness of people convicted as part of the
China Initiative is “China” and not just the intellectual-property theft or false
statements or whatever the specific illicit conduct might be, then we are back
to all of the concerns expressed in Part III: China is being criminalized.
Beyond the retributive calculations on the level of individual
defendants, the rhetoric around the China Initiative also speaks of “China’s
maligned behaviors.” 380 More generally, the U.S. government is seen as
“punishing” China as part of the trade dispute. 381 How is blameworthiness
measured for the PRC party-state? The more practical concern is that China
cannot be punished through the U.S. criminal justice system. It is one thing
to “punish” the PRC party-state via tariffs or sanctions, 382 but the subjects of
criminal punishment are individuals. The more that the bad acts of the PRC
party-state are attributed to individual defendants, the more necessary it is to
pause and ask whether association with “China” is in part what is driving the
punishment. If a person is an accomplice of a bank robber, that accomplice’s
punishment is not enhanced because the bank robber from which accomplice
liability flows is a serial bank robber.
It bears repeating that there is strong evidence that the PRC party-state
is directing and incentivizing at least some criminal activities. There is a
threat. In addition, the PRC party-state has demonstrated its own use of
retribution—or, more bluntly, retaliation—for acts of which the leadership
disapproves. At the time of writing, Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael
Spavor had been detained in the PRC for over two years. 383 The allegations
380

Barr, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Alan Rappeport & Ana Swanson, Peter Navarro, Trump’s Trade Warrior,
Has Not Made His Peace With China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/us/politics/peter-navarro-china-trade.html
[https://perma.cc/CUT4-HRTL] (“Mr. Navarro is still looking for ways to punish China”).
382
Over the course of writing this Article, the Trump administration’s rhetoric escalated
regarding retaliation for China’s handling of the coronavirus. See, e.g., Jeff Mason, Matt
Spetalnick & Humeyra Pamuk, Trump Threatens New Tariffs on China in Retaliation for
Coronavirus, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-corona
virus-usa-china/trump-threatens-new-tariffs-on-china-in-retaliation-for-coronavirusidUSKBN22C3DS [https://perma.cc/S8JY-3CF9]; Joseph A. Wulfsohn, John Bolton declares
China ‘responsible’ for coronavirus outbreak, says world must hold them ‘accountable’, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/world/john-bolton-declares-china-respon
sible-for-coronavirus-outbreak-the-world-must-act-to-hold-them-accountable [https://perma.
cc/K5LJ-Q7Z7].
383
See Nathan Vanderklippe, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor Mark 600 Days in
Detention in China, GLOBE & MAIL (July 31, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com
/world/article-600-days-in-detention-a-sobering-milestone-for-michael-kovrig/ [https://perm
a.cc/8N8T-AQKR]; Peter Zimonjic, China grants Canadian officials consular access to
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against them remain unclear, but it is widely seen—at least outside the
PRC—that the detentions were at least in part retaliation for Canada’s
detention of Huawei CFO, Meng Wanzhou. 384 The PRC party-state has also
been known to retaliate against foreign companies that complain about their
treatment in the PRC or who cooperate with the U.S. government. 385
What the DOJ can and should do is steadfastly pursue a principled path
and craft a response to the actions of the PRC party-state without enveloping
a broader conception of China into that threat. The December 2019 report by
the JASON group is instructive. The Report provides nine
recommendations—all written in country-neutral language—that provide
increased safeguards and greater emphasis on collaborative responses to
threats, as well as broader supportive measures like expanding, “[e]ducation
and training in scientific ethics.” 386 It notes that, “[l]ike any émigrés, [U.S.
citizens originally from the PRC] must be treated as fellow residents or
citizens of our country and should be judged on their personal actions and
not by profiling based on the actions of the government and political
institutions of their home country.” 387
Michael Kovrig, but not to Michael Spavor, CBS NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021)
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/michael-kovrig-spavor-consular-access-1.5883882
[https://perma.cc/K8RQ-WYL6].
384
Chun Han Wong, John Lyons & Josh Chin, ‘No Coincidence’: China’s Detention of
Canadian Seen as Retaliation for Huawei Arrest, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2018, 11:49 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-coincidence-chinas-detention-of-canadian-seen-asretaliation-for-huawei-arrest-11544619753
[https://perma.cc/PT56-RWCF];
Andy
Blatchford, Trudeau Rejects Calls to End Huawei Exec’s Extradition to U.S., Even If It Would
Free Jailed Canadians in China, POLITICO (June 25, 2020, 1:10 PM),
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9851[https://perma.cc/D3HW-AGUL] (reporting the Prime Minister’s repeated assertion that
“China has made a direct link between the Canadians’ arrests and Meng’s case”); Donald
Clarke, China is Holding Two Canadians as Hostages. It’s Not Even Denying It, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2018, 3:13 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/17/china-isholding-two-canadians-hostages-its-not-even-denying-it/
[https://perma.cc/Q6MD-3XT9]
(“When China responds to criticism of the Kovrig/Spavor detentions by raising the Meng case,
that is an admission that it’s all about retaliation.”).
385
Zarit, supra note 179, at 02:28:00 (commenting how the retribution against companies
“is real”).
386
JASON, supra note 197, at 3.
387
Id. at 23; cf. NAT. INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., NIH GRANTS
POLICY STATEMENT, IIB-31 (Dec. 2019), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgp
s/nihgps.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E4C-CKD7] (“[Research service awards] program is
conducted in compliance with applicable laws that provide that no person shall, on the grounds
of race, color, [or] national origin, . . . be excluded from participation in[ or] be denied the
benefits of . . . receiving Federal assistance.”); see also Michelle Tesoro, Preventing National
Origin Discrimination, EDI BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.edi.nih.gov/blog/comm
unities/preventing-national-origin-discrimination [https://perma.cc/23HT-TC8L].
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E. AN INITIATIVE BY ANY OTHER NAME

Discarding the China Initiative in favor of an initiative with a countryneutral name like the “Espionage Initiative” or “Intellectual Property
Protection Initiative” may seem cosmetic. At worst a “China” initiative might
persist sub rosa within the DOJ and not be subject to the sunlight of external
appraisals. 388 An initiative by another name might smell as unsweet. 389
Prosecutors have tremendous discretion that is often shielded from outside
scrutiny, 390 and removing the “China” label does not guarantee a change in
how the DOJ views persons possessing China-ness. Yet names do matter. 391
In the different context of why using the language of human rights matters,
Philip Alston explained, “human rights language does matter. It provides a
context and a detailed and balanced framework, . . . it brings into the
discussion the carefully negotiated elaborations of the meaning of specific
rights that have emerged from decades of reflection, discussion, and
adjudication.” 392
At issue with the China Initiative is not the absence of language but
rather the presence of language: the words that the DOJ chooses to describe
its work bring to the forefront what the U.S. government has decided is
salient in identifying and combatting criminal threats. The broad conception
of “China” cannot be ameliorated by statements that the real concern is the
Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party, or both coupled with
assurances that the United States still welcomes people with ties to the
PRC. 393
Admittedly, there is no easy way to respond to well-established
concerns that the PRC party-state is connected to violations of U.S. criminal
388
Cf. Hvistendahl, supra note 242 and accompanying text (telling the story of “hundreds
of people surveilled under a previously unreported FBI program [dating to the late 1960s] that
targeted ethnic Chinese scientists and students living in the United States”).
389
Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2. l. 46 (“What does a name
mean? The thing we call a rose would smell just as sweet if we called it by any other name.”).
390
See, e.g., Jed. S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And
What Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2017) (critiquing how
prosecutors who are “the advocates for one side are given near-total power over the resolution”
of criminal cases).
391
Cf. Jelena Djordjevic, Johan N. Lundstrom, Francis Clément, Julie A. Boyle, Sandra
Pouliot & Marilyn Jones-Gotman, A Rose by Any Other Name: Would it Smell as Sweet?, 99
J. NEUROPHYSIOL. 386–393 (2008) (finding that same odors were rated as more pleasant when
given a positive name and more negatively when given a negative name).
392
Philip Alston, Keynote Address at the Nordic Trust Fund for Human Rights and
Development Annual Workshop: Rethinking the World Bank’s Approach to Human Rights
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
15275&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/4GJ9-KC62].
393
Cf. Wray, supra note 13.
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laws. But there is a better way. The term “smart on crime” is popular. 394 Part
of being smart on using criminal law to protect economic and national
security is to enhance communication with the scientists, engineers, and
educators who are creating valuable technologies. U.S. Attorney Andrew
Lelling, for instance, has recognized that the DOJ needs to learn more about
how the science works: “The investigators involved have to build their own
expertise in the underlying activity. And I think you see that here.” 395 In
September 2019, dozens of leading organizations representing the scientific
community wrote to the U.S. government welcoming greater collaboration
and expressing that “[o]ur organizations and members are witnessing an
escalating concern among U.S. and international scientists that new policies
and procedures under consideration to minimize security risks will have the
unintended effect of harming the scientific enterprise.” 396 Kevin
Droegemeier, then-Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), responded promptly and positively by outlining
work underway to coordinate work across agencies under the umbrella of the
Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE). 397 Director
Droegemeier also spoke at the October 2019 FBI Academia Summit. 398
In discussing the work of JCORE’s Subcommittee on Research Security
as part of his congressional testimony in February 2020, Director
Droegemeier both noted thefts and surreptitious influence by the PRC
government and also affirmed that, “[t]o maintain our global leadership,
America must balance protecting its research enterprise while promoting the

394
Ed Chung, Smart on Crime: An Alternative to the Tough vs. Smart Debate, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (May 12, 2017, 8:53 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminaljustice/news/2017/05/12/432238/smart-crime-alternative-tough-vs-soft-debate/
[https://perma.cc/9LB3-V5LJ].
395
See Widener, supra note 178.
396
Open Letter from Multiple Science Associations to U.S. Government on Foreign
Influence (Sept. 4, 2019) (available at https://www.aibs.org/position-statements/20190904_fo
reign_influence.html [https://perma.cc/ZC3S-TDQL]).
397
See Kevin Droegemeier, Dir. of Off. of Sci. and Tech., Letter to the United States
Research Community (Sept. 16, 2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2019/09/OSTP-letter-to-the-US-research-community-september-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7U9K-FNHG]; see also JOINT COMM. ON THE RSCH. ENV’T & NAT’L SCI. &
TECH. COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF THE 2019 WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT (JCORE) (Nov. 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Summary-of-JCORE-Summit-November-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H36F-E6P4].
398
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 125., at
1–2.
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openness that has been and will continue to be critical to our success.” 399 This
testimony followed remarks in January 2020 on the “systemic threat” from
the PRC government: “We live in a world very different today than we did
even 10 years ago, so we want to have the proper amount of vigilance and
oversight.” 400 Whether in the Biden administration OSTP and JCORE can
cement a role in balancing concerns of law enforcement and the scientific
and academic communities is uncertain, but collaboration is one possible
path to decrease reliance on deterrence through the criminal law.
Increased collaboration between the government and the communities
that create valuable science and technology is necessary but not sufficient.
The DOJ also needs to be “smart on China” by increasing cultural
competency, linguistic ability, 401 and knowledge of substantive areas that are
critical to the U.S.–PRC relationship. Even work on how to more accurately
pronounce the Pinyin Romanization system can demonstrate respect for
people with Chinese names. The DOJ can take a step toward this goal by
strengthening channels for meaningful, sustained conversations between the
government and nongovernmental experts. This requires forging ties with
precisely those people being stigmatized by the China Initiative. The DOJ
has expressed its desire to do this work and has taken initial steps: 402 “Done
well, our China Initiative will not only improve the way law enforcement
responds to China’s economic aggression, but also will raise our country’s

399
The President’s FY 2021 Budget Request for Research & Development: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 116th Cong. 5 (2020) (Statement of Kevin
Droegemeier Dir. Of Off. of Sci. and Tech.) (emphasis in original); see also Jeannie Baumann,
Scientists Hiding Foreign Ties Prompt Concerns from White House, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 27,
2020, 3:50 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/scientists-hidingforeign-ties-prompt-concerns-from-white-house
[https://perma.cc/5DWS-7MQN]
(“Droegemeier’s office has tag-teamed with the FBI’s field offices to step up audits of the
disclosure forms. ‘Universities aren’t set up to do that. They don’t have the information, so
the audits need to be done by law enforcement,’ he said.”).
400
Rick Sobey, Trump’s Science Adviser: Boston Lab Theft Case Part of ‘Systemic
Threat’ From China, BOS. HERALD (Jan. 14, 2020, 8:11 PM), https://www.bostonherald
.com/2020/01/14/donald-trumps-science-adviser-sounds-alarm-on-systemic-threat-fromchina-cites-boston-case/ [https://perma.cc/F9HU-47LV].
401
Coleman, supra note 31, at 03:53:00 (“The Chinese language is extraordinarily
important.”).
402
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 182 (“Engagement outside of government is another
essential part of our work. Each of our 56 field offices has frequent, substantive engagement
with universities and businesses in its area of responsibility . . . .”); OFF. OF PRIV. SECTOR,
supra note 125, at 2 (“Director Christopher Wray welcomed members of the summit to the
FBI, reinforcing that Academia is one of the greatest assets of the US and therefore the FBI.
Trust and cooperation between the FBI and Academia is absolutely critical to the Bureau’s
mission.”).

224

LEWIS

[Vol. 111

awareness of the threats and how we as a people can work to protect
ourselves and our assets from them.” 403
The DOJ is stressing the need for the private sector to work with law
enforcement when intellectual property has been compromised. 404 And
academia is becoming more sensitized of the need to assess and adjust their
policies and procedures regarding reporting of foreign contacts. 405 But for
true collaboration, the DOJ needs to shift from messaging what it views as
the threats to more substantive, bi-directional collaboration with
nongovernmental experts. 406 To do this right will take time. What the DOJ
has in its power to do immediately is to drop “China” from the name of the
initiative and instead focus on individual cases free from an overarching
specter of a China threat.
CONCLUSION
While Congress has not actually written “China” into the criminal
statutes themselves, the DOJ has criminalized “China” by pursuing it as an
explicit enforcement priority.407 This is problematic because it stigmatizes
403

Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 9.
See, e.g., Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI and Corporate
Directors: Working Together to Keep Companies Safe from Cyber Crime, Remarks by
Christopher Wray at the National Association of Corporate Directors Global Board Leaders
Summit (Wash. D.C., Oct. 1, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/s
peeches/the-fbi-and-corporate-directors-working-together-to-keep-companies-safe-fromcyber-crime [https://perma.cc/249H-XHZW]) (“We want to work with you, we want to help
you. But we can’t do anything to help if you don’t turn to us.”).
405
See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 31, at 03:29:00 (commenting that universities are now
“in an environment where we must have more coordination . . . .”). Enhanced transparency is
also critical to conversations regarding how to protect academic freedom. See, e.g., HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, RESISTING CHINESE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE ACADEMIC
FREEDOM ABROAD: A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COLLEGES, UNIVERSITIES, AND ACADEMIC
INSTITUTIONS WORLDWIDE 3 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporti
ng_resources/190321_china_academic_freedom_coc_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CZP-5MUT]
(“Disclose all Chinese government funding. Publicly disclose, on an annual basis, all sources
and amounts of funding that come directly or indirectly from the Chinese government.”).
406
See Lewis, supra note 32 (arguing for enhanced collaboration with multiple
communities to avoid the U.S. government’s response to a “China threat” from creating selfinflicted wounds on values); cf. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 108,
at 10 (“The FBI has yet to develop an effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities,
government laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment
plans.”); Id. at 96 (“Notably, the FBI’s [Office of Private Sector] did not have a dedicated
outreach team for U.S. universities until July 2019.”) (citing a Fed. Bureau of Investigation
briefing with the Subcommittee which took place on Oct. 31, 2019).
407
Congress has, however, written “foreign” into certain criminal statutes. Yet it is
difficult to discern what is foreign and, in a number of contexts, it is questionable whether a
404
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natural and legal persons who are seen as possessing a shared characteristic
of China-ness. This threat-by-association lumps together a broad array of
people and entities as connected within an encompassing “China” web. An
expansive conception of China takes on an anthropomorphic form of a
perpetrator.
The China Initiative is further problematic when assessed against the
standard yardsticks for the DOJ’s decisions to prosecute and, ultimately, for
convicted individuals to be punished. The overwhelming emphasis on
national security is impeding the ability to engage in a clear-eyed assessment
of the costs that come with the China Initiative. The Initiative has been
gaining speed, but the DOJ should instead tap the breaks and reassess the
reasons for and wisdom of this construct.
Yangyang Cheng, a particle physicist who was born in the PRC but is a
researcher in the United States, reflected: “I have three important sheets of
paper as the world sees it: my Chinese passport, my U.S. visa, and my Ph.D.
diploma. It is somewhat ironic, that with the tenuous relationships I have with
both my birth country and my adopted home, as well as the directions both
governments are headed, my diploma is the paper I am least likely to lose.” 408
If the DOJ pauses and rethinks the direction that it is headed, the United
States will be less likely to lose talent like Dr. Cheng.

foreign link increases the threat of harm or the actor’s blameworthiness. See Margaret K.
Lewis, When Foreign is Criminal, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 625 (2015).
408
Yangyang Cheng, Fault Lines in Humanity, SUPCHINA, Feb. 26, 2020, https://sup
china.com/2020/02/26/fault-lines-in-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/7YSV-DTEB].

